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ABSTRACT
Essays on Channel Deletion and Channel Contraction
BY
Binay Kumar
July 09, 2021
Committee Chair:

Dr. Naveen Donthu

Major Academic Unit:

Department of Marketing

With the advent of online, mobile, and social media channels, firms have an array of channels in their
channel mix. The proliferation of channels has increased marketing costs and may be detrimental to a firm’s
competitive position. Also, firms confront diverse issues, including channel conflict, cannibalization,
cooperation, and control in today’s omni-channel environment. As the payoff of resource allocations differs
across channels, I contend that judicious deletion of channels can be a viable option not only to reduce the
channel-related concerns but also to enhance firm performance. Channel deletion is an emerging
phenomenon in the real world and is currently receiving special attention in the industry. Further
understanding is required concerning what drives a firm’s channel deletion decision and how this influences
various channel issues, and ultimately that firm’s performance. In my dissertation study, I propose a
comprehensive framework depicting drivers and outcomes of channel deletion. Drawing on multiple
theoretical perspectives, I present a set of propositions that 1) identify drivers of channel deletion, 2) link
channel deletion to channel cooperation and customer reactance which then influences firm performance, and
3) describe various contextual factors that govern the proposed relationships. Subsequently, I also investigate
the influence of channel deletion strategy on firm value. Along with channel deletion (i.e., full deletion),
firms are involved in the channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion) as well. While these strategies aim to
reduce costs, thereby improving efficiency, there is a perception of risk (i.e., uncertainty over future cash
flows). Using the data of 314 announcements made by 146 publicly traded U.S. firms across 39 industries
over five years, I demonstrate the significant effect of channel deletion and channel contraction strategies on
firm value and firm risk. I also observe that stock market reaction to channel deletion is more favorable than
channel contraction; however, the firm value associated with the channel deletion attenuates in case of higher
market turbulence. Further, channel deletion strategies enhance firm risk; however, the advertising intensity
helps in reducing the risk. My dissertation study offers important insights regarding the channel deletion and
contraction strategies for marketing theory and practice.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With the commercialization of the internet and subsequent digital innovation, firms have
added many channels, including the company outlet, retail store, franchisee, online, social media,
and mobile app. Such a proliferation of channels has magnified the costs of selling the products or
services. In the end, firms need to assess whether the costs associated with each channel are
commensurate with the expected benefits. Owing to resource constraints, managers are typically
asked by their firms to evaluate the benefits of adding as well as deleting a channel. My dissertation
examines channel deletion, a phenomenon that is currently receiving special attention in the
industry. Although various firms are involving themselves in channel deletion, there is a dearth of
research on this issue. Past studies have predominantly focused on channel addition and have not
had the opportunity to examine the channel deletion strategy of the firm. Essay 1 of my dissertation,
titled “Channel Deletion: Bane or Boon?” is a conceptual paper that focuses on the antecedents and
consequences of channel deletion. Drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives (e.g., social
exchange theory and customer reactance theory), I demonstrate that channel deletion helps in
improving firm performance. Further, I identify the drivers of channel deletion utilizing the political
economy paradigm (PEP).
Although channel deletion is currently receiving special attention in the industry, an
understanding of its influence on firm value and firm risk remains scant. Along with channel
deletion (i.e., full deletion), firms are also involved in the channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion).
While these strategies aim to reduce costs, thereby improving efficiency, there is a perception of
risk (i.e., uncertainty over future cash flows). More understanding is required concerning how and
why channel deletion affects firm value and firm risk. Essay 2 of my dissertation, titled “The Effect
of Channel Deletion and Channel Contraction on Firm Value and Firm Risk,” is an empirical paper
that investigates the stock market reaction to channel deletion and channel contraction strategy.
7

Drawing on information economics theory, I further aspire to understand the contextual factors
which might influence such reactions. Through this study, we answer the relevant research
questions of 1) how and why channel deletion affects firm value and risk, 2) how these effects differ
from those of channel contraction, and 3) what some of the factors are, which moderate these
effects. Using data from a multitude of firms from multiple industries, and utilizing choice
modeling and seemingly unrelated regression modeling, this study shows that deletion strategies
influence firm value and firm risk. Our study contributes to the literature by exploring both firm
value and firm risk. From a practitioner viewpoint, it helps managers better understand both the
returns and risks associated with channel deletion and channel contraction, thereby make more
informed decisions on these issues.
The two essays of my dissertation seek to understand both the theoretical and practical
reasons for channel deletion. Overall, my dissertation study provides insights not only on the effect
of channel deletion and channel contraction strategies on firm performance but also on why firms
are involved in channel deletion. Taken together, the theoretical explanations and new insights can
offer substantial value to marketing practice.

8

Chapter 2
Essay 1: Channel Deletion: Bane or Boon?
(Being Revised for Resubmission to the Journal of Marketing)

Abstract
Firms confront diverse issues, including channel conflict, cannibalization, cooperation, and
control in today’s omni-channel environment. While a firm may use numerous channels, it is the
quality of the channel mix rather than the quantity that is key in satisfying the firm's customer base.
As the payoff of resource allocations differs across channels, we contend that judicious deletion of
channels can be a viable option not only to reduce the channel-related concerns but also to enhance
firm performance. Channel deletion is an emerging phenomenon in the real world and is currently
receiving special attention in the industry. Further understanding is required concerning what drives
a firm’s channel deletion decision and how this influences various channel issues, and ultimately
that firm’s performance. In this study, we propose a comprehensive framework depicting drivers
and outcomes of channel deletion. Drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives, we present a set of
propositions that 1) identify drivers of channel deletion, 2) link channel deletion to channel
cooperation and customer reactance which then influences firm performance, and 3) describe
various contextual factors that govern the proposed relationships. Finally, we offer guidance to
managers concerning channel deletion strategy.
Keywords: channel deletion, transaction cost economics, channel conflict, channel cooperation,
customer reactance
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Introduction
“Changes in distributive channels may not matter much to GNP and macroeconomics. But,
they should be a major concern to every business and industry”.
(Peter Drucker 1990, p. A12)
Channel-related issues have always been considered important by marketing thinkers and
practitioners. Frazier (1999, p. 238) states, “As the world economy evolves, more and more
companies are highlighting channel management as among their very top priorities.” The
company’s channels of distribution represent a foundation for its other marketing policies (Lilien et
al. 1992). Kotler and Keller (2012) also note that the decisions surrounding marketing channels are
among the most critical ones management faces.
Over the years, especially with the advances in technology, firms have added many
channels, including the salesforce, company outlet, retail store, wholesale distributor, franchisee,
online, call center, catalog, mobile app, and social media to provide value to their customers.
However, channels usually constitute a significant percentage of the total cost of marketing a
product, and the proliferation of channels has magnified the cost. A key question is whether the
value from the customer is greater than the value to the customer. Kotler and Keller (2012)
document that in the United States, advertising typically accounts for 5 percent to 7 percent of the
final selling price, whereas marketing channels account for 30 percent to 50 percent of the final
price. The firm needs to allocate considerable resources to all offered channels and, therefore, the
success of the firm in meeting its objectives is highly dependent upon how well the firm’s channel
members perform (Lewis and Lambert 1991). Also, the level of performance attained by channel
members is pivotal for the firm in achieving a competitive advantage and profitability (Mehta et al.
2002). Past research argues that multichannel customers are more profitable customers (Venkatesan
et al. 2007). Thus, the question of whether channel deletion is a bane or boon remains unknown.

10

Neslin et al. (2006) assert that channel performance evaluation is crucial for designing an
appropriate multichannel strategy and those channel members whose performance is not on par with
the firm’s objectives must be assisted or, as a last resort, removed. Perreault Jr , Cannon, and
McCarthy (2013) also contend that there is no value in embracing an outdated channel structure as
eliminating channels can add more value to the firm.
We define channel deletion as an activity involving the decision to discontinue a channel
format and/or reliance on a class of intermediary. Channel deletion has the potential to enhance firm
performance because a firm can free up resources by deleting a channel and subsequently redeploy
some of these resources in the continuing channels to enhance the competitive standing and
financial performance (Kumar 2003; Varadarajan et al. 2006). The freed-up resources – financial as
well as managerial –were previously spent coordinating and controlling a large number of channels.
The leaner channel mix (due to channel deletion) is likely to provide managers with greater
opportunities to focus on the remaining channel entities, and thereby exert better control over those
channel entities. Additionally, as a result of the redeployment of resources, the remaining channels
would be in a better position to provide enhanced services to customers.
We have observed many instances of channel deletion in the recent past. For example, in
February 2019, Tesla, Inc. (a US Electric vehicle manufacturer) announced that it would eliminate
its brick-and-mortar retail channel in pursuance of diverting more resources into improving the
services, and only sell its vehicles online.1 The decision to shift away from brick-and-mortar retail
was necessary for the firm to remain financially sustainable, Tesla stated. It is expected that this
move will help the firm in cutting expenses considerably. The CEO of Tesla said, “We’re moving
all sales online…Worldwide, the only way to buy a Tesla will be online. It is a hard decision, but I
think it’s the right decision for the future.” As another example, Sony announced closure of its

1

https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/tesla-close-stores-online-sales-model-3/
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online store in August 2015.2 In May 2016, Victoria's Secret (a Womenswear manufacturer)
eliminated its catalog as the majority of its customers do their shopping online. The company’s
finance chief said that the company spends a significant amount ($150 million a year) producing
catalogs that no longer spur sales.3 In May 2019, another firm, H&M (a fashion retailer), announced
the elimination of its catalog. The firm said that the discontinuation of its catalog is a result of the
changing shopping pattern as customers prefer to shop online.4 Hence, through the channel deletion
act, firms expect that the impact of costs saved would be higher than lost sales. In table 1, we
provide representative examples of channel deletion.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Firms are realizing that continuing with several channels increases marketing costs without
providing commensurate benefits. The proliferation of channels has created a challenge for firms to
manage and control them effectively (Kotler and Armstrong 2013; Neslin et al. 2006). Kumar
(2003) note that the manufacturer is always tempted to expand the distribution channels. However,
having too many channels chasing fewer customers results in lowered support for the firm and, in
the long run, such situation can adversely impact the brand image and competitive position of a firm
(Frazier and Lassar 1996). While firms should exploit market potential efficiently through different
channels, they need to avoid overly intensive distribution. A firm with an overly intensive network
may face escalated intra-brand competition (Palmatier et al. 2016) and thereby channel conflicts
(Falk et al. 2007; Kotler and Armstrong 2013), whereas a firm that reduces the number of channels
controls or avoids unhealthy intra-brand competition and channel conflict (Jindal et al. 2007;
Käuferle and Reinartz 2015). Channel conflict can ruin the cooperative relationship among channel
members, leading to lower overall profits (Ganesan et al. 2009). Also, the intra-brand competition

2

https://www.eyeonmobility.com/2015/online-sony-store-closing-on-august-28th/
https://www.usmagazine.com/stylish/news/victorias-secret-will-stop-sending-catalogs-w207842/
4
https://www.retailwire.com/discussion/hm-will-cease-printing-its-catalog-after-39-years/
3
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puts pressure on prices, which leads to the alienation of intermediaries. The following is a typical
channel conflict instance associated with Apple, Inc.:
"Apple would like to sell everything themselves. They keep opening more and more retail locations.
Every time they open another store, they are potentially putting a solution provider out of
business.”5
(Quote from one of the retailers offering Apple products)
In effect, firms need to take suitable action proactively rather than reactively. If the firm
undertakes timely corrective actions (e.g., channel deletion), the adverse situations may be avoided
and, hence, such channel-related action needs to be taken as strategic initiatives to remain
profitable. As an analogy, firms undertake brand deletion to enhance organizational performance
(Varadarajan et al. 2006) as per the marketplace requirements and to signal that they are taking
proactive steps to adapt to the changing business needs.
We contend that channel deletion needs careful consideration as it can have a positive
impact on firm performance. This study is required to ascertain why firms actually delete the
channel, and how the channel deletion is linked to firm performance. Such a study can impart novel
insights, but surprisingly little research has been undertaken to provide a thorough understanding of
channel deletion. Researchers have given a call to study this phenomenon, e.g., Srinivasan and
Hanssens (2009) document that research is needed on channel deletion, while Verhoef, Kannan, and
Inman (2015) similarly state that more research is required on channel deletion. Despite the
importance of works on channel deletion, to the best of our knowledge, only Konus, Neslin, and
Verhoef (2014) have examined this phenomenon. However, their study only focuses on the
influence of search channel deletion on the purchase behavior of customers and does not discuss the
drivers of channel deletion or the influence of channel deletion on continuing channel entities.

5

https://www.logicbay.com/blog/companies-who-faced-channel-conflict-and-won-one-who-didn-t
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Therefore, in this study, we address the following research questions:
1)
2)
3)
4)

What factors influence channel deletion?
How channel deletion affects demand and supply side consequences?
How firm performance is influenced by channel deletion?
How the contextual factors firm-owned vs externally-owned channel, and B2B vs B2C
influence the proposed relationship between channel deletion and its antecedents?

Study Motivation
Extant research typically emphasizes channel addition, and the current push towards an
omni-channel strategy also seems to focus only on channel addition. This perspective fails to
address the issue of channel deletion, which is currently exhibited by many firms. A firm cannot
continue to increase channels because of the inability to get a commensurate return from the
individual channel. In this regard, social exchange theory suggests that the relationship between two
people or two organizations is created and maintained through a process of cost-benefit analysis
(Blau 1964; Homans 1958). The core assumption of social exchange theory is that people or
organizations seek to maximize their profits. If the costs outweigh the benefits, it may be an
indicator that it’s time to move on (Lambe, Wittmann, and Spekman 2001). For example, we make
decisions regarding customers based on how much effort is needed compared to how rewarding the
relationship would be to the firm (Luo and Kumar 2013). Further, we also consider whether to stay
in the relationship and for how long by assessing pros and cons. Hence, social exchange affects the
relationship between people or organizations and interaction may continue if the level of
performance is deemed acceptable.
In an evolving retail landscape, firms need to adapt to the changes in the marketplace.
Palmatier et al. (2016) contend that the channel system needs to adapt to the significant changes in
the business environment, including the consolidation of channel intermediaries, the development of
new channel formats, and increased online shopping. Several firms have undertaken channel
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deletion in the past, e.g., Ryanair (a European low-fare airline) closed its airport check-in desks.6 In
Feb 2018, Best Buy announced the deletion of its mobile stand-alone store channel.7 The CEO of
Best Buy said, “We feel good about the opportunity to retain customers and transition them to
another one of our sales channels.” However, customers may show unwillingness in transitioning to
another channel. Hence, the firm should have the requisite ability to transition the affected
customers to the retained channels.
In recent years, various firms have undertaken channel deletion. Some examples of channel
deletion are as follows:
•
•
•

Bebe, a women’s clothing retailer, is in the process of deleting its brick-and-mortar stores
channel, and the retailer will continue to operate online.8
Sony announced the deletion of its company outlets. The business will be redirected to Sony’s
online store and retailers, Sony said.9
The Limited, a clothing retailer, announced the deletion of its brick-and-mortar stores channel,
and the retailer continues online.10

Besides the above examples, several other firms (e.g., American Apparel, Bose Corporation,
Steven Alan) have undertaken channel deletion. Levi Strauss & Co. halted direct sales to avoid
channel conflict.
To avoid channel conflict, many firms attempt to create channel arrangements such that each
channel caters to a particular segment of customers, e.g., one channel for high-value customers, and
another channel for low-value customers. However, such an arrangement usually does not work as
intended by the firms, because customers are changing and in their quest to get the best of both
worlds, they approach more than one channel for the same requirement. Vinhas and Heide (2014)
also argue that a manufacturer can only establish rules of which channel is allowed to serve a

6

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7903656.stm
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/best-buy-to-close-all-250-of-its-smaller-mobile-phone-stores.html
8
https://wwd.com/business-news/retail/bebe-shutters-all-stores-focus-online-retail-fashion-10855950/
9
https://www.polygon.com/2015/1/17/7629599/all-sony-stores-in-canada-are-closing-down/
10
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/01/06/the-limited-is-closing-all-of-its-250- stores/
7
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particular set of customers, however, the manufacturer cannot dictate to customers how to source
their requirements. Such customer behavior leads to overlapping sales and generates conflict among
channel members. Vinhas and Anderson (2005) contend that customers can destroy firm value
through free-riding behavior as they may purchase in a discount channel while using the services of
a premium channel. Accordingly, some kind of deliberate action is needed by the firms, and channel
deletion can be the action to enable firms to respond to the changing behavior of customers.
Firms are undertaking channel deletion to become more efficient as well as for several other
reasons. In Table 2, we provide key potential benefits and drawbacks associated with channel
deletion. These benefits and drawbacks constitute relevant inputs into the channel deletion decision.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Deletion does not solely involve offline channels, e.g., CompUSA and Levis Strauss deleted
their online channel in the past (Yan et al. 2010). However, in the recent channel deletion instances,
firms have predominantly deleted offline channels. Although both manufacturer and retailers are
involved in channel deletion, in this study, we are not taking the perspective of customer facing
retailers but rather that of a manufacturer/brand owner with a well-established channel presence
involving one or more formats and intermediaries.

Conceptual Framework
Drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives, we present a conceptual framework
delineating the antecedents and consequences of channel deletion. In Table 3, we provide the
definitions of key terms.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Whether a firm should keep a large number of channels or a relatively small number of
channels is a part of a channel design decision (Anderson et al. 1997; Kotler and Armstrong 2013).
Channel design refers to the development of new marketing channels or the modification of the
16

existing channel structure (Mehta et al. 2002; Rosenbloom 2012). Rosenbloom further states that
channel design implies developing an effective and efficient channel structure. Hence, channel
structure needs to be closely analyzed for successful channel design (Mallen 1973). Rosenbloom
(2012) defines channel structure as “the group of channel members to which a set of distribution
tasks has been allocated.” Although number of channels, channel length, and distribution intensity
have been considered as the dimensions of channel structure (Mallen 1973; Mehta et al. 2002), in
this study, we focus on the number of channels, which is a key dimension of the channel structure.
We adopt the political economy paradigm (PEP) as the theoretical foundation to guide our
understanding of why firms are involved in the channel deletion. Political economy paradigm has
been used in a number of channel related studies (Achrol and Stern 1988; Dong, Zeng, and Su 2019;
Dwyer and Oh 1987; Grewal et al. 2018). Stern and Reve (1980) assert that the adoption of this
paradigm helps in the understanding of a channel phenomenon. Stern and Reve also note that the
firm’s choice of strategies in complex social environments is driven by the political and economic
forces internal and external to the firm. Arndt (1983) argues that PEP is appropriate for analyzing
exchange structures and processes within and between organization, as it focuses on authority and
control patterns, conflict and conflict management procedures, and external and internal
determinants of institutional change. The political economy framework suggests two major systems:
1) external political economy, and 2) internal political economy. Also, both the systems have two
components: 1) economy, and 2) polity. Overall, PEP suggests that four dimensions - external
economy (the prevailing and prospective economic environment in which channel exists), external
polity (the external sociopolitical system in which channel operates), internal economy (the
economic forces within the channel), and internal polity (the power-dependence relationship within
the channel) - are likely to influence channel structure and behavior, which in turn impacts channel
as well as firm performance (Achrol et al. 1983; Arndt 1983; Stern and Reve 1980).
17

Political economy framework helps in identifying the major variables which can influence
channel structure and behavior (Stern and Reve 1980). Accordingly, we consider both economic
and political (i.e., behavioral) aspects to identify key variables which can affect our focal construct
(i.e., channel deletion). Regarding the consequences of channel deletion, we argue that channel
deletion affects both channel entities and customers, but quite differently. We draw from social
exchange theory and reactance theory to enhance our understanding of the consequences of channel
deletion. In our study, we include channel cooperation as the effect of channel deletion on channel
entities (supply-side consequences), and customer reactance as the effect of channel deletion on
individual customers (demand-side consequences). Finally, channel deletion impacts firm
performance. As noted by Grewal et al. (2018), firm performance (e.g., profit) is a key outcome in
the political economy paradigm. Since, the relationship between channel deletion and its
antecedents may be context dependent, we include contextual factors to conceptualize various
relationship. As shown in Figure 1, we consider the contextual factors such as whether channel is
firm-owned or externally-owned as well as whether customer is business customer (i.e., B2B) or
end consumer (i.e., B2C). We also opine that firm performance (e.g., profit) may feeds back into
the channel deletion decision, as prior performance could mitigate or build up pressure to delete a
channel. Accordingly, we provide feedback loop in our proposed model.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Drivers of Channel Deletion
What factors may lead a firm to embrace channel deletion? As previously described,
political economy framework can help in identifying the major variables which can influence
channel deletion. Accordingly, we consider the four dimensions of PEP to come up with the drivers
of channel deletion. First, the normal use of the transactional arrangements or the decision-making
modes has been viewed as a part of the external economy (Arndt 1983), and competitors have been
18

considered to influence the direct exchange relationship of firm with its channel entities (Achrol et
al. 1983). Kotler and Keller (2012) stress that in competitive markets, firms might need to drop
individual marketing channels or channel members to be successful. Second, behavior of external
actors (e.g., customers) may affect the organization’s goals and internal functioning (Arndt 1983).
With the digital innovation, shopping behavior of customers has been evolved and we observe
increase in the cross-channel buying behavior (i.e., searching in one channel and purchasing in
another channel). This is a vivid exemplar of external political force. Third, the task of the internal
economy is to coordinate behavior and to allocate resources for promoting efficiency. From
efficiency perspective, firms need to conduct the cost benefit analysis for its channels, and in case
of greater number of channels (i.e., channel access), there is higher need to involve in such analysis.
Also, degree of coordination (key aspect of internal economy) would be affected by the channel
access. Fourth, the internal polity refers to the power system of the social unit and can be described
as a mechanism for managing conflicts (Palmatier et al. 2016). Channel power helps firm in having
better control over its channel entities and also in managing conflicts that lead to an effective
distribution system and ultimately in achieving high levels of performance (Achrol et al. 1983;
Gilliland et al. 2010; Jaworski 1988). In summary, our conceptual model of channel deletion
includes market competition, cross-channel buying, channel access, and channel power as the
representative variables of the four dimensions of PEP, i.e., external economy, external polity,
internal economy, and internal polity, respectively. Accordingly, we consider these variables as the
driving factors to channel deletion.

Outcomes of Channel Deletion
Channel cooperation. Management of the marketing channel is traditionally deemed a very
challenging task as the interests of the manufacturer and channels entities are not always aligned,
and their goals may be in conflict (Celly and Frazier 1996), ultimately leading to low channel
19

cooperation. In multichannel marketing, firms need to ensure that their channels work well together,
as the channel would be most effective when all members cooperate to attain the overall objectives.
However, channel cooperation has been identified as a major challenge for multichannel firms
(Rangaswamy and Van Bruggen 2005). The deletion of the channel benefits the continuing channel
entities as the firm’s sales are shared among those entities only, which prompts continuing channel
members to cooperate with the firm. In this context, social exchange theory postulates that
individuals nurture a relationship because of the benefits of interactions in the relationship (Blau
1964). Due to channel deletion, continuing channel members receive the greatest share of the
benefits and would therefore better cooperate with the firm. Stern and Reve (1980) assert that
greater cooperation from channel members provide improved competitive strength and ultimately
enhances the joint profits.
Customer reactance. Deletion of a channel would affect customers who purchase (or search)
through that channel, and such a decision may inconvenience those customers (Konuş et al. 2014).
Avery et al. (2012) contend that customers usually prefer to stay in the channel in which they shop.
Forcing customers to use another channel may deter them because they may have to use a channel
that they may not prefer (Neslin and Shankar 2009). In this situation, customers may experience a
loss of freedom, provoking customer reactance (Reinders et al. 2008; Trampe et al. 2014).
Reactance theory suggests that when people feel threatened in their freedom of choosing an action,
they get an unpleasant feeling, called reactance (Brehm 1966). Vinhas and Heide (2014, p.164) also
note, “customers are likely to react negatively when they feel the manufacturer is imposing
constraints on their buying behavior.” Such reactance may lead to a drop in the firm profit initially.
However, the firm would be able to free crucial (financial and managerial) resources through
channel deletion and may better utilize some of those resources in the remaining channels. Further,
a firm may be able to increase awareness as well as incentivize affected customers appropriately to
20

shift to other channels. Verhoef (2012) contend that rewarding customers can help mitigate the
negative effects of reactance. Also, through the reallocation of resources, the firm can strengthen
retained channels and provide enhanced services to its customers. This may significantly improve
customer satisfaction, thereby enhancing the firm profit (Anderson et al. 1994).

Discussion
This article addresses the call for research on channel deletions (Homburg et al. 2014;
Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Extant research has mainly focused on channel addition and its
impact on firm performance, despite the novel insights that can be gathered from a thorough
understanding of channel deletion. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first study
which presents a comprehensive framework to understand the channel deletion phenomenon. As the
first in-depth study on this phenomenon, our research contributes to the marketing channels and
buyer-seller literature streams through: 1) introducing a comprehensive framework of channel
deletion and 2) examininig both the channel entities and customer aspects in the channel system.
Our framework offers insight into managing multichannel systems in the event of channel
deletion. A firm can employ a large number of channels to increase the market coverage (Day 1981;
Frazier and Lassar 1996), which is not necessarily the best decision because this approach is
expensive and offers no guarantee of performance. The various channels vary in their costs of
operation and effectiveness (Kumar and Venkatesan 2005). Hanssens and Pauwels (2016) further
assert that the payoff of resource allocations differs across channels. Because of the differing
profitability across channels, managers must ascertain which channels are most desirable (Avery et
al. 2012). Given that business environments are dynamic, firms should not mistakenly embrace an
outdated channel structure (Vinhas et al. 2010). The market mechanism forces a firm to make
rational decisions, and accordingly deleting an inappropriate channel may be a good move;
otherwise, in the long run, the firm may not survive the market.
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Table 1. Representative examples of Channel deletion
Firm

e.l.f.
Beauty

Description
e.l.f. Beauty said that it would close all its company outlets
as it looks to focus on expanding its brand in national
retailer and digital channels. The company view that the
resources needed to operate own store can be better utilized
in marketing, product development, and driving sales
growth through retailer channels.

Announced

February 2019

Bose

Given the dramatic shift in online buying, Bose announced
closure of all its US stores. The company statement said,
“we focused on what our customers needed, and where they
needed it — and we're doing the same thing now."

January 2020

Bebe

In the midst of trying to reorganize itself, Bebe announced
today that it will shutter all of its brick-and-mortar locations
by the end of next month. The company statement said that
it would transition to an online-only model.

April 2017

“We have evaluated strategic alternatives to maximize the
value of the Kitchen Collection format and reached the
Hamilton difficult but necessary decision that it is in the best interests
of the company and all of its stakeholders to wind down this
Beach
format by the end of 2019,” said Gregory Trepp, president
and CEO of Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company.

October 2019

Best Buy is planning to close all of its 250 smaller-format
mobile phone stores by the end of May. CEO of Best Buy
Best Buy said, “We believe the best way to serve customers is to sell
phones in channels where they have access to our whole
range of connected devices.”

February 2018

Sony

Sony said, “We are closing all our Sony Stores and will
redirect this business through Sony retailers, Online … as
well as through our Sony-trained Telesales team.”

Tesla

Tesla will stop selling solar door-to-door. The company
plans to expand its retail and online sales of solar systems,
including in Tesla stores. It will also continue selling
systems through long-standing partnerships with retailers,
including Home Depot and Best Buy. “We believe this
decision reflects what most of our prospective customers
prefer, and will result in a better experience for them … We
expect the growth of these channels to end up more than
offsetting the loss of door-to-door sales,” Tesla said.
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January 2015

April 2017

Table 2. Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of Channel Deletion
•

Benefits
Reduction in channel conflict

•

Drawbacks
Customer inconvenience

•

Reduction in channel cannibalization

•

Customer reactance

•

Better channel control

•

Reduction in market penetration

•

Reduction in free-riding behavior

•

Decrease in sales

•

Low channel coordination effort

•

Reduction in information

•

Reduction in distribution costs

•

Business risk

•

Reduction in customer confusion

•

Freeing up resources for better utilization
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Table 3. Definition of Key Terms
Key terms
Definition
Channel
The medium through which the firm and the
customer interact
Marketing
The sets of interdependent organizations
channel
involved in the process of making a good or
service available for consumption or use
Channel design The development of new marketing channels or
the modification of existing channel structure
Channel
The group of channel members to which a set
structure
of distribution tasks has been allocated
Channel
Activity involving the decision to discontinue a
deletion
channel from the firm’s channel mix
Channel
The dispute that occurs when one channel
conflict
member’s action prevent another channel from
achieving its goal
Horizontal
The dispute that occurs among the firm’s
channel conflict channels
Vertical
channel conflict
Channel
cannibalization
Channel control

The dispute that occurs between the channel
and the firm’s management
Reduction in sales in a preexisting channel, due
to the introduction of another channel
The uses of power to create an effective and
efficient allocation of resources within channel
structure
Channel
The extent to which channel members work
cooperation
together with one another and the firm’s
management in a close and constructive manner
Channel
The simultaneous and consistent employment
coordination
of various channels
Market
The degree to which the market of the company
competition
is characterized by intense competition
Channel power The ability of a firm to alter channel members’
behavior so that they take actions they would
not have taken otherwise
Customer cross- The propensity of the firm’s customers to
channel buying switch channels within purchase
Channel access The number of channels utilized by the firm in
the multichannel system
Customer
Motivational state in which a customer feel
reactance
threatened in its freedom of choosing an action
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Source
Neslin et al. (2006)
Palmatier et al. (2016)
Mehta et al. (2002);
Rosenbloom (2012)
Rosenbloom (2012)

Kumar et al. (1992)
Coelho and Easingwood
(2004); Fürst et al. (2017)
Fürst et al. (2017); Webb
and Lambe (2007)
Avery et al. (2012)
Frazier and Rody (1991)
Anderson and Narus
(1990)
Mohr and Nevin (1990);
Pentina and Hasty (2009)
Fürst et al. (2017); Kumar
et al. (1992)
Anderson and Coughlan
(2002); Draganska et al.
(2010)
Fürst et al. (2017);
Verhoef et al. (2007)
Jindal et al. (2007); Fürst
et al. (2017)
Brehm (1966, 1989)
Trampe et al. (2014)

Figure 1. Channel Deletion: A Conceptual Framework
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Chapter 3
Essay 2: The Effect of Channel Deletion and Channel Contraction
on Firm Value and Firm Risk
Abstract
With the advent of online, mobile, and social media channels, firms have an array of
channels in their channel mix. The proliferation of channels has increased marketing costs and
may be detrimental to a firm’s competitive position. Although channel deletion is currently
receiving special attention in the industry, an understanding of its influence on firm value
remains scant. Along with channel deletion (i.e., full deletion), firms are also involved in the
channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion). While these strategies aim to reduce costs, thereby
improving efficiency, there is a perception of risk (i.e., uncertainty over future cash flows).
Using the data of 314 announcements made by 146 publicly traded U.S. firms across 39
industries over five years, we demonstrate the significant effect of channel deletion and channel
contraction strategies on firm value and firm risk. We also observe that stock market reaction to
channel deletion is more favorable than channel contraction; however, the firm value associated
with the channel deletion attenuates in case of higher market turbulence. Further, channel
deletion strategies enhance firm risk; however, the advertising intensity helps in reducing the
risk. The study offers important insights regarding the channel deletion and contraction strategies
for marketing theory and practice.
Keywords: channel deletion, channel contraction, marketing channel, marketing-finance
interface, firm value, firm risk
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Introduction
Channel strategy is foundational for every business and a key source of competitive
advantage (Coughlan and Jap 2016). With the commercialization of the internet and subsequent
digital innovation, firms have added many channels, including the company outlet, retail store,
wholesale distributor, franchisee, online, call center, and mobile app. Such a proliferation of
channels has magnified the costs of selling the products or services. In the end, firms need to
assess whether the costs associated with each channel are commensurate with the expected
benefits. Neslin and Shankar (2009) note that multichannel customer management is not only
about the introduction of new channels but also about their elimination. Owing to resource
constraints, managers are typically asked by their firms to evaluate the benefits of adding as well
as subtracting a channel (Coughlan and Jap 2016).
We define channel deletion as an activity involving the decision to discontinue a channel
format and/or reliance on a class of intermediary. Although, there may be an apprehension of
associated risk (i.e., uncertainty over future cash flows), we contend that channel deletion has the
potential to enhance firm value because a firm can free up resources by deleting a channel and
subsequently redeploy some of these resources in the continuing channels to enhance the
competitive standing and financial performance (Kumar 2003; Varadarajan, DeFanti, and Busch
2006). Due to the redeployment of freed-up resources (financial as well as managerial), the
continuing channels would be in a better position to provide enhanced services to the customers.
Recently, we have observed many instances of channel deletion. For example, in
February 2019, Tesla, Inc. (a U.S. Electric vehicle manufacturer) announced that it would
eliminate its brick-and-mortar retail channel in pursuance of diverting more resources into
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improving the services in other channels.11 As another example, in January 2015, Sony closed all
its company outlets.12 The company stated, “We are closing all our Sony Stores and will redirect
this business through Sony retailers, Online … as well as through our Sony-trained Telesales
team.” In February 2018, Best buy deleted its mobile stand-alone store channel.13 In the recent
past, many more firms such as Bebe, American Apparels, and Steven Alan have undertaken
channel deletion. Firms are realizing that continuing a large array of channels increases
marketing costs without providing commensurate benefits.
Channel deletion is an emerging phenomenon in the real world, and researchers suggest
to study this topic (Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014; Verhoef, Kannan, and Inman 2015).
While academic research shows that channel deletion influences purchase behavior of customers
(Konuş, Neslin, and Verhoef 2014), no research has examined whether channel deletion
influences firm value. Frazier (1999) notes that empirical marketing research has remained
largely silent on the market value of channel measures. Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) also
state, “the relationship between channel strategy and market valuation is under-researched …
research is needed on channel deletions as well.” Adding or dropping distribution channels or
even specific distribution channel partners is not trivial (Ailawadi 2021). Despite the theoretical
and practical importance of channel deletions and its outcomes, research on this topic is scarce.
Van Bruggen et al. (2010) note that in their distribution system, firms not only need to
consider the number of channels but also the intensity within each channel. Perreault Jr, Cannon,
and McCarthy (2013) state that the ideal distribution intensity would make a brand available
widely enough to satisfy, but not exceed, target customers’ needs. Over the years, firms do add
https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/tesla-close-stores-online-sales-model-3/
https://www.polygon.com/2015/1/17/7629599/all-sony-stores-in-canada-are-closing-down/
13 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/best-buy-to-close-all-250-of-its-smaller-mobile-phone-stores.html
11
12
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or subtract channel or channel partners (Coughlan and Jap 2016). In real life, we have observed
numerous instances of firms’ involvement in channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion).
Homburg et al. (2014) specifically mention that future research should investigate both channel
deletion and channel contraction.
We define channel contraction as an activity involving the decision to decrease the
number of channel entities within an existing channel. An illustrative example of channel
contraction is the reduction of 160 retail stores by Crocs (a footwear manufacturer) in March
2017.14 As another example, Sears closed 80 retail stores in December 2018.15 In Table 1, we
provide a few representative examples of channel deletion as well as channel contraction.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Investors and managers have an interest in both return and risk; examining one without
the other results in an incomplete picture. Extant literature suggest that firm (stock) risk is a key
component of shareholder value that matters to financial markets and managers (Grinblatt and
Titman 1998; Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009). In this research, we investigate the effect of channel
deletion and channel contraction on firm value as well as firm risk. Firm risk is marked by stock
price volatility and can be captured through idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk reflects the
portion of risk associated with firm-specific actions, and it accounts for 80% of a firm’s total risk
(Han, Mittal, and Zhang 2017; Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009). A firm has more information than
investors about its important marketing resource changes (e.g., channel deletion), which creates
an information asymmetry. This situation leads to increased investors’ uncertainty about the
firm’s intention, resulting in higher stock volatility (i.e., risk).

14
15

https://www.retaildive.com/news/crocs-to-close-160-stores-by-the-end-of-2018/437260/
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/12/28/sears-store-closing-list-80-more-sears-kmart-stores-close-march/2433974002/
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Through our study, we attempt to answer the following research questions:
1. What are the effects of channel deletion and channel contraction on firm value?
2. Do channel deletion and channel contraction cause firm risk?
3. Is channel deletion more harmful than channel contraction on firm value, and firm
risk, or vice versa?
4. Are the effects of channel deletion and channel contraction on firm value, and
firm risk, context dependent?
We address these questions by developing and empirically testing hypotheses that relate
channel deletion and channel contraction to firm value and firm risk. We develop and estimate
our model using a data set of 314 announcements (made by 146 publicly traded U.S. firms)
assembled from multiple data sources across 39 industries over five years spanning between
2015 and 2019. We do not include 2020 in our dataset because many firms were forced to move
from offline to online due to an unprecedented exogenous shock (i.e., COVID-19). Utilizing the
event study method, we calculate abnormal stock returns and idiosyncratic risks associated with
channel deletion and contraction. To account for potential selection bias, we specify a
multinomial selection model (Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand 2007). Finally, we use a
seemingly unrelated regression model to test our hypotheses.
First, we find a significant stock market response associated with channel deletion and
contraction. The study results show that both channel deletion and channel contraction have
positive association with firm value; however, channel deletion strategies lead to negative
abnormal returns in 40% of the instances. Second, we find that the magnitude of the stock market
response is context dependent and varies by market turbulence and advertising intensity. In
particular, firm value associated with the channel deletion is attenuated for firms operating in the
market with greater turbulence. Third, channel deletion is significantly associated with the risk,
whereas channel contraction has no significant association with it. Further, advertising intensity
reduces the risks associated with both channel deletion and channel contraction. Owing to the
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study’s cross-industry research design, we believe that the insights gained from the empirical
analysis are largely generalizable.
Our study makes important contributions to both marketing theory and practice. From a
theoretical perspective to our knowledge, this research offers the first detailed explanation of
how and why channel deletion affects firm value and risk, how these effects differ from those of
channel contraction, and what are some of the factors, which moderate these effects. This study
contributes to the literature by exploring both firm value and firm risk. From a practitioner
viewpoint, it helps managers better understand both the returns and risks associated with channel
deletion and channel contraction, thereby make more informed decisions on these issues. Taken
together, the theoretical explanations and new insights can offer substantial value to the field.
We organize the rest of the paper in the following manner. First, we provide the
managerial relevance of this study by using a triangulation approach that discusses marketplace
evidence, related research, and managerial interactions, followed by our conceptual framework
and a set of hypotheses explicating the relationship presented in the framework. We then provide
our modeling approach and describe the results. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications
for theory and practice, and conclude with the limitations and future directions for this research.

Study Importance
We infer the importance of our study by employing a triangulation approach: using
marketplace evidence, related literature, and managerial interactions.
Marketplace Evidence: Previously, we provided a few examples of channel deletion and
channel contraction as the marketplace evidence (Table 1). We use this marketplace evidence to
augment the understanding of channel deletion strategies. For example, Sony opted for the
deletion of its online channel in August 2015 with the perception of getting cooperation from the
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retained channel entities (e.g., retailers).16 As another example, e.l.f. Beauty went for channel
deletion of its company outlets in February 2019. At that time, analysts noted that the deletion
would help the firm better allocate its resources to other channels, product development, and
brand-building activities.17 Such examples help us to understand the expectations of the
marketplace as a consequence of channel deletion strategies.
Related Literature. Multiple channels provide positive outcomes through the extended
market coverage; however, firms may get hurt as a multiple channel structure can be very
difficult to manage (Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996). Extant research studies have shown
that the introduction of the new channel is positively related to the firm value (Geyskens,
Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Homburg et al. 2014). Conversely, some researchers have
expressed their concern about the cannibalization hazards faced by the firms due to the new
channel, especially in case the new channel is similar to an existing channel (Pauwels and Neslin
2015). Further, when a firm uses a large number of channels, the number of people required to
control channel activities increases, thereby creating room for communication problems. In this
situation, it becomes very difficult for the firm to coordinate marketing efforts and ensure a
consistent level of service across channels. If the firm’s offer reaches the market with different
service levels, it leads to customer resentment and confusion (Coelho, Easingwood, and Coelho
2003). Hence, the relationship between the number of channels and firm performance may be
more complex than previously thought, and the strategy of using many channels may not be
appropriate.
To date, there is only one study on channel deletion, and it focuses on the deletion of a
search channel. In this study, Konuş et al. (2014) examined the impact of eliminating a search

16
17

https://www.imaging-resource.com/news/2015/08/01/sony-says-its-closing-its-online-us-store-on-august-28th
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/elf-beautys-plan-to-close-all-of-its-stores-gets-analyst-support-2019-02-27
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channel on customer purchase behavior in terms of purchase incidence, order size, and channel
choice. The study found that channel elimination decreases purchase incidence; however, order
size per purchase increases. The authors also observed that savings from eliminating the search
channel compensate for lower sales revenue, leading to a net positive impact on profit. In our
study, we focus on the deletion of transaction channels. The study of Srinivasan et al. (2013)
talks about the effect of opening and closing stores on the chain retailer’s performance
(especially on firm value). This study is somewhat closer to our research; however, our research
is different for at least three reasons: 1) we consider deletion of all types of transaction channels,
2) our study includes the manufacturer and retailer, and 3) we focus on firm value and firm risk.
In the extant literature, we find studies for the new product announcement (Rao, Chandy,
and Prabhu 2008; Warren and Sorescu 2017) as well as product deletion and product recall
(Avlonitis 1985; Boulding, Morgan, and Staelin 1997). Similarly, there are studies on both brand
addition and brand deletions (Varadarajan et al. 2006; Wiles, Morgan, and Rego 2012). As far as
channels are concerned, prior studies primarily focused on channel additions (Geyskens et al.
2002; Homburg et al. 2014). While channel deletion currently receives special attention in many
industries, studies on channel deletion are scant.
Channel deletion is not similar to brand deletion, as the value-generating conditions for
channel deletion may differ from that of brand deletion. For example, brand deletion is beneficial
in case of disposal of a brand that is relatively unrelated to the rest of the brand portfolio due to
unlikely potential synergy (Wiles et al. 2012). However, channel deletion is beneficial if the
channel being deleted is relatively similar to an existing channel by way of reducing the
cannibalization hazards (Pauwels and Neslin 2015).
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Managerial Interactions: Based on our interaction with 34 managers from various firms
across industries (see Appendix A for more details), we present the key findings related to this
study. For example, channel deletion may not be considered as the opposite of channel addition.
An important difference between channel addition and channel deletion is that firms have a lot
more information about their channels when considering deleting the channel than they have
about adding a new channel. However, channel deletion may lead to the loss of some of the
benefits associated with channel addition, such as the inability to access certain target markets
and thereby the lack of information about the market, competition, and customers (Homburg et
al. 2014). Also, in the case of channel deletion, firms may need to deal with a lot more issues
such as customer backlash, permanent loss of the customer, and transitioning customers between
the channels. Hence, channel deletion decision depends on how firms can react to these issues.
Further, channel deletion may not be considered just as a cost-saving measure; rather, it involves
various channel related issues, including channel coordination and channel cooperation.
In summary, the triangulation approach clearly presents evidence for the need to conduct
this study.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development
When a firm undertakes channel deletion or channel contraction, investors update their
expectations of the firm’s future cash flows, (which reflects the firm value) as well as
vulnerability in future cash flows, (which reflects the firm risk). Since risks and returns are a
measure of stock price informativeness, we use Information economics as the theoretical
foundation for our work (Connelly et al. 2011; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 2000). Information
economics theory identifies two mechanisms: Screening and Signaling. We use these
mechanisms to contextualize the link of channel deletion and contraction with firm value and
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firm risk. Investors vigilantly scan the environment and typically consider market turbulence as a
screening cue. Also, firms signal a credibility cue not only to reduce the investors’ uncertainty,
but also to enhance their confidence in the firm’s action. Prior research suggests that advertising
intensity serves as an important market signal to suggest a firm’s financial well-being to the
investors (Joshi and Hanssens 2010; Srinivasan et al. 2013). Hence, in our study, we explore
whether the financial market’s reaction to channel deletion and contraction is moderated by (a)
market turbulence, and (b) advertising intensity. In Figure 1, we present our conceptual
framework delineating the relationships of channel deletion and channel contraction with
moderators, firm value, and firm risk.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]

The Effect of Channel Deletion on Firm Value and Firm Risk
We expect that channel deletion would enhance firm value for at least three reasons.
First, the firm is able to free financial and managerial resources due to channel deletion. Some of
the untied resources can be employed on continuing channel entities to strengthen those entities.
Hence, the firm would be able to provide superior services to its customers through the retained
channels, which in turn may enhance the satisfaction and loyalty of customers. Thus, we expect
that channel deletion would enhance firm value. Second, in an organization, different channels
are typically managed by different managers. Resource misallocation usually occurs when there
is a lack of proper coordination among these managers. Specifically, different managers may be
overspending on their respective channels, which may decrease the level of future cash flow.
Through channel deletion, the firm is in a better position to control such resource misallocation,
which may lead to enhanced cash flows, and thereby an increased firm value. Third, channel
members typically possess more information about the market than the manufacturer (Desiraju
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and Moorthy 1997; Gu et al. 2010). This information asymmetry creates incentives for the
channel members’ opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000). Transaction cost economics
explicates that the firm’s managers can be exploited by opportunistic channel members in such a
situation (Watson IV et al. 2015). The opportunistic behavior of channel members restricts value
creation and, in the long-term, adversely affects the manufacturer’s performance (Wathne and
Heide 2000). To reduce the opportunistic behavior of channel members, the manufacturer uses
monitoring as a control mechanism (Wang, Gu, and Dong 2013). In the case of a leaner channel
mix (due to channel deletion), a firm is in a better position to monitor its channel network,
thereby able to reduce opportunism. Such a reduction in channel members’ opportunistic
behavior can improve a manufacturing firm’s performance. Finally, channel deletion is expected
to benefit the retained channel entities, as the sales would get shared among those entities only.
As posited by the social exchange theory, in this situation, the channel entities would have a
higher motivation to stay and cooperate with the firm. This act of channel entities helps in
customer acquisition and retention, ultimately leading to an improved firm performance (Achrol
and Etzel 2003).
On the other hand, deletion strategies may be perceived as risky. Channel deletion may
inconvenience customers, which can reduce their satisfaction. Also, in such a situation,
customers may display a lower commitment to the firm, thus increasing the volatility of future
cash flows. Since channel deletion impacts a larger customer base, this implies that it may lead to
greater vulnerability in the cash flows. Overall, channel deletion may decrease the predictability
of a firm’s future income streams because of which it is associated with risk. Additionally, the
firm-specific news about the channel deletion may lead to larger fluctuations in the stock price as
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investors may not have clarity about such a move, i.e., whether the focal firm is undertaking a
restructuring measure or is facing financial hardship. Therefore, we contend:
H1: Channel deletion is positively associated with (a) firm value, and (b) firm risk.

The Effect of Channel Contraction on Firm Value and Firm Risk
We expect that channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion) would enhance firm value for at
least three reasons. First, due to channel contraction, the firm can free the crucial resources (as in
the case of channel deletion). Some of the untied resources (i.e., money, personnel, time) can be
employed on the continuing channel members. The greater deployment of resources on the
continuing channel members facilitates them in performing the tasks, which would enhance the
performances. However, the cost savings would be lower in case of channel contraction. Second,
in case of increased distribution intensity, intrachannel competition heightens for a
manufacturing firm because a greater number of channel members (e.g., independent retailers)
compete for the similar customers. This competition may lead to a lower cost efficiency due to
increased cannibalization (Deleersnyder et al. 2002). Third, increased distribution intensity has a
greater potential to enhance the free-riding behavior of channel members on sales services
(Dutta, Heide, and Bergen 1999; Vinhas and Anderson 2005). To reduce such negative behavior
of channel members, firms may need to take disciplinary actions. In this regard, the network
theory suggests that the disciplinary action against a member (e.g., channel contraction) forces
other members to focus more on their performance. Even a small change in one area can have a
huge impact on the overall network. By observing the punitive act of the manufacturer, channel
members' attitudes, interests, and behaviors are more likely to realign with the manufacturer's
expectations. Hence, from a network perspective, the members of continuing channels learn from
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the firm’s action and become more compliant and diligent in satisfying the requirements of the
manufacturer, which helps the manufacturer in achieving superior performances.
Conversely, channel contraction may inconvenience the customer (as in the case of
channel deletion), which may enhance volatility in revenue stream (i.e., firm risk). However, in
this case (in comparison with channel deletion), a relatively smaller customer base would be
affected. Also, channel contraction does not reduce the diversity of channel system. Hence,
association of channel contraction with idiosyncratic risk may be weak. Accordingly, we
hypothesize:
H2: (a) Channel contraction is positively associated with firm value but less valuable than
channel deletion, and (b) Channel contraction is positively associated with firm risk but
less harmful than channel deletion.

The Moderating Effect of Market Turbulence
We expect that market turbulence may influence the firm value associated with channel
deletion or channel contraction. Jaworski and Kohli (1993) note that changes in customer
preferences lead to market turbulence. Investors tend to be more cautious while evaluating firm
performance in case of a more turbulent market than in the less turbulent market. We believe that
the positive influence of channel deletion or channel contraction on firm value would be less
salient in markets with a greater turbulence than in those with a lower turbulence for at least two
reasons. First, a firm's products and services are likely to require relatively little modification in
less turbulent markets where the customers' preferences do not change much. Morgan, Anderson,
and Mittal (2005) note that consumers exhibit relatively invariant choices in stable markets. By
contrast, firms that operate in the more turbulent markets have to modify their products and
services continually in order to satisfactorily cater to customers' changing preferences. Chung
and Low (2017) also note that in industries with a high market turbulence, firms constantly need
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to invest heavily in marketing activities such as sales efforts, promotions etc. As firms need to
spend more resources to meet changing customer preference in case of high market turbulence,
cost savings achieved due to channel deletion or contraction may not remain intact. Second, in
more turbulent market, retained channel entities are less likely to get additional sales due to
deletion act of the firm, thus they would not have additional motive to cooperate with the focal
firm. In such a situation, it is likely that the channel entities will act opportunistically, i.e., they
can defect the focal firm and join the competitors (Dutta et al. 1999). Hence, a firm needs to
invest in additional safeguarding and monitoring. This would reduce the cost savings generated
due to channel deletion or contraction. Third, taking disciplinary action against channel members
in the turbulent market may heighten negative sentiments among the retained channel members,
which can lower their performances. Overall, we expect that channel deletion or channel
contraction is more likely to translate into lower firm value in more turbulent markets than in less
turbulent markets. Stated formally:
H3: The greater the market turbulence, the weaker the positive relationship of (a) channel
deletion, and (b) channel contraction, with firm value.
We also expect that market turbulence may influence the firm risk associated with
channel deletion or channel contraction. In more turbulent markets, firms compete more
intensely, and in this situation, customers are more likely to switch to competitive offers. In
market with greater turbulence, even highly satisfied customers are difficult to retain. Hence,
channel deletion or channel contraction is more likely to translate into higher risk. On the
contrary, in less turbulent markets, it is easier to meet customer preferences, which should lower
customers’ perceived inconvenience due to channel deletion or channel contraction. Overall, we
expect that channel deletion or contraction is more likely to translate into higher risk in more
turbulent markets than in less turbulent markets. Accordingly, we propose:
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H4: The greater the market turbulence, the stronger the positive relationship of (a)
channel deletion, and (b) channel contraction, with firm risk.

The Moderating Effect of Advertising Intensity
We focus on advertising intensity because it provides credibility signal to investors in
firm’s action (Joshi and Hanssens 2010; Panagopoulos, Mullins, and Avramidis 2018; Srinivasan
et al. 2013). We expect that firm’s advertising intensity may influence the firm value associated
with the channel deletion or contraction for at least two reasons. First, advertising enhances both
current and future sales (Joshi and Hanssens 2010), it would directly benefit the retained channel
entities. Hence, focal firm would get more cooperation from those entities resulting in a greater
firm value. Second, advertising enhances a customer’s preference towards the focal firm (Keller
1993). The superior services from the retained channel entities in lieu of channel deletion make
customers attached to the focal firm, with results even stronger in the case of prior preference
generated through advertising. Hence, we expect that the firm value associated with channel
deletion or channel contraction would be higher for the firms, which are involved in higher
advertising. Accordingly, we propose:
H5: The higher the advertising intensity, the stronger the positive relationship of (a)
channel deletion, and (b) channel contraction, with firm value.
We also expect that advertising intensity may influence the risk associated with channel
deletion or contraction for at least two reasons. First, advertising intensity influences investors
through quality-signaling mechanism, i.e., more advertising signals a firm’s financial well-being
to investors (Joshi and Hanssens 2010). The investors may perceive that channel deletion
strategies are being undertaken by firm as a restructuring move. The higher advertising intensity
signals firm’s competitive viability and commitment to growth (Panagopoulos et al. 2018),
making adverse market reaction (i.e., risks) due to channel deletion or contraction less sensitive.
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Panagopoulos et al. (2018) also argue that firm advertising intensity lessens information
asymmetry through quality signaling, which increase investors’ belief that the firm has ability to
effectively compete in the market. Hence, firms with higher advertising intensity should enjoy a
buffer in comparison to firms with lower advertising intensity when investors are leaning toward
assigning risk associated with the channel deletion or contraction to the firm.
Second, advertising signals the quality of product to the customers (Moorthy and Zhao
2000), and also differentiates firm’s product in the mind of customers (Joshi and Hanssens
2010). Advertising impacts customers’ attitude and behavior favorably (Brodie, Whittome, and
Brush 2009; Vakratsas and Ambler 1999), which may result in the lower discontent of customers
towards the focal firm for the inconvenience due to channel deletion or channel contraction.
Hence, the customer would stick with the focal firm, which would reduce the risk induced due to
channel deletion or channel contraction. Based on these arguments, we contend:
H6: The higher the advertising intensity, the weaker the positive relationship of (a)
channel deletion, and (b) channel contraction, with firm risk.

Research Method
Data Collection
To empirically test our hypotheses, we compiled a sample of channel deletion and
channel contraction from Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and newswire services including PR Newswire
and Business Wire. We assembled data for our study from different sources as these data are not
readily available from a single source. First, we obtained firms’ annual operational and financial
information from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Second, we obtained firms’ daily stock
information from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices. Finally, we
obtained data on the daily risk factors (i.e., market, size, value, and momentum factor) from
Kenneth French’s Data Library (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ faculty/ken.french/
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data_library.html). The sample includes publicly traded firms listed on the three major stock
markets in the United States (i.e., AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ).
We searched the channel deletion and contraction announcements in various news
sources (e.g., Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and Newswires) using a combination of search terms, one for
the channel (e.g., store or retailer or online) and other for deletion (e.g., eliminate or stop or
discontinue) as well as contraction (e.g., shrink or deplete or curtail). Using this search protocol,
we identified announcements that talk about channel deletion or channel contraction and come
up with over thirty one thousand news articles. We then performed content analysis to the news
articles and captured the main concept within the text. By doing this, we arrive at approximately
nine hundred news articles that talk about channel deletion or channel contraction. Subsequently,
we scrutinized the news articles to categorize announcements into channel deletion and channel
contraction and also identify the channel. Finally, we compiled a list of 357 channel deletion and
contraction announcements. The use of multiple sources to gather deletion announcements
helped ensure that we identify as many events as possible and enable validation of the earliest
public release of information. As suggested in the literature, we screened events for
contemporaneous financial (e.g., quarterly reports, dividend announcements), management (e.g.,
executive management changes, mergers and acquisitions), and marketing (e.g., new product
releases) announcements occurring within two days either side of the announcement. After
removing observations with missing values and confounding events, the final sample comprised
of 314 observations (made by 146 firms over five years across 39 four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification [SIC] code industries). In Table 2, we present the distribution of firms across
industries.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
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Dependent Variables
Abnormal Stock Return. A firm’s stock price reflects investors’ aggregate expectations
regarding the firm’s future cash flows (Fama 1991). Investors’ reactions to channel deletion or
channel contraction would be based on their expectations of its impact on the firms’ cash flows.
In our study, we measure firm value through the Abnormal Stock Return (AR). We compute AR
through the event study method, which has long been used by marketing scholars to quantify the
economic returns associated with the firm’s marketing actions (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987;
Tellis and Johnson 2007). Using Fama-French-Carhart four factor model (Carhart 1997; Fama
and French 1993), we calculate abnormal returns on event day as well as cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) for several windows, including seven days before and after the event day, to
account for information leakage before the event day or information dissemination after the
event day. Given the conventional view that markets move quickly to fully impound the profit
performance implications into security prices at the event (Fama 1970), we focus primarily on
the short-horizon abnormal returns around the event in our analysis. However, as a robustness
measure, we calculate long-horizon stock return to check for anomalies in investors’ reaction at
the event that might occur if investors underreact or underappreciate such information (Jacobson
and Mizik 2009).
Following Swaminathan and Moorman (2009), we estimate the stock market return of
each firm from the CRSP database during a 240-day period ending ten days before the event day.
According to this model, expected abnormal returns are calculated taking into account four
distinct risk factors: market, size, value, and momentum.
Rit - Rft = ai + β1i (Rmt – Rft) + β2i (SMBt) + β3i (HMLt) + β4i (UMDt) + εit
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where i stands for firm, t stands for time (i.e., event day), Rit denotes the returns for firm i
at time t, Rmt is the average return of all stocks trading at time t, Rft is the risk-free rate of return
at time t, SMBt is the difference between rate of returns of small and large-market capitalization
stock portfolios on day t (i.e., size factor), HMLt is the difference between returns of high and
low book-to-market stock portfolios on day t (i.e., value factor), and UMDt is the difference
between rate of return of high and low prior return stock portfolio on day t (i.e., momentum
factor). εit is the independent and identically distributed error term.
We used the estimates obtained from the Carhart four-factor model to predict the daily
abnormal returns (ARit) for each firm for the event days. The abnormal return to an event is
calculated as the difference between the normal return, which would have occurred on that day
given no event and the actual return that did occur because of the event, thus:
ARit = Rit – E(Rit) = Rit – {a
! i + "#1i (Rmt – Rft) + "#2i SMBt + "#3i HMLt + "#4i UMDt}

Next, we need to determine an appropriate event window [t1, t2] that is long enough to
ensure any information leakage as well as dissemination of information regarding the channel
deletion or channel contraction announcement. Assuming efficient information processing, an
event window should be as short as possible (McWilliams and Siegel 1997), which suggests an
event window that encompasses only a specific trading day (Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha Jr 2010).
In addition to this theoretical consideration, we also validate the event window empirically,
following established procedures (Geyskens et al. 2002; Warren and Sorescu 2017). We
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms in our sample for various event windows
and tested the significance of these event windows:
$!
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Idiosyncratic Risk. Standard deviation of εit (i.e., error term) represents the idiosyncratic
risk. We estimate the risk due to channel deletion or contraction by comparing the risk before
and after the event (Thomaz and Swaminathan 2015). Following Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998)
and Thomaz and Swaminathan (2015), we calculate the firm idiosyncratic risk for the period
between –60 trading days and –10 trading days before the announcement, as well as for the
period between +10 trading days and +60 trading days after the announcement, using the
deletion announcement as the day 0. The difference between these two measures is our
dependent variable idiosyncratic risk.
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Independent and Control Variables
We code the channel deletion and channel contraction according to the information
gathered from various sources. We measured market turbulence as the standard deviation of
sales growth within the industry over the three years preceding the event (Homburg et al. 2014).
To measure advertising intensity, we used the reported advertising expenditure of a firm in
relation to the sales (Malshe and Agarwal 2015). Since U.S. Security and Exchange commission
requires firms to disclose advertising expenditure, we assume that a firm’s advertising
expenditure is zero in the case of non-disclosure of this information (Jindal 2020). Several
extraneous factors can influence our proposed relationships. To account for such effects, various
firm-level and industry-level control variables are considered as prescribed in the literature. We
present the details of control variables in the Appendix B. In Table 3, we provide an overview of
the variables, its operationalization, data sources, and literature sources. The summary statistics
of the key variables is presented in Table 4. The mean abnormal stock return in the sample is
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0.64, and idiosyncratic risk is 0.11 respectively. Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for the key
variables.
[Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here]

Model Specification
To test the hypothesized relationship of contextual factors, we develop a regression
model for the firm value and firm risk.
Firm_Valueit = a0 + a1Market_Turbulenceit + a2Advertising_Intensityit + a3Market_Sizeit
+ a4Market_Growthit + a5Market_Concentrationit + a6Firm_Sizeit + a7Sales_Growthit
+ a8ROAit + a9Financial_Leverageit + a10Profitabilityit + a11SGA_Ratioit + a12B2Bi + a13Producti
+ ∑+
*'( :* !'";%+)&* + ∑,'( q, <=*), + εit
Firm_Riskit = γ0 + γ1Market_Turbulenceit + γ2Advertising_Intensityit + γ3Market_Sizeit
+ γ4Market_Growthit + γ5Market_Concentrationit + γ6Firm_Sizeit + γ7Sales_Growthit
+ γ8ROAit + γ9Financial_Leverageit + γ10Profitabilityit + γ11SGA_Ratioit + γ12B2Bi + γ13Producti
+ ∑+
*'( >* !'";%+)&* + ∑,'( ?, <=*), + µit

Here, subscript i represents the firm, and subscript t represents the day. Year dummies
and industry dummies are used to account for factors that vary by year and by industry,
respectively. We control for unobserved heterogeneity through the industry and year fixed
effects. εit and µit are the error terms associated with firm value and firm risk, respectively. a, !,

q, γ, #, $ represent parameters.

Addressing Endogeneity
The firms do not make channel deletion or channel contraction decisions randomly but
based on some strategic reasons. In our study context, first, the firm needs to decide on channel
deletion strategies, and conditional on this decision, one can observe the firm performance.
Hence, there is potential for endogeneity in our model (due to the self-selection) that may bias
the coefficients of the firm performance function, and we need to account for such biases. We
can alleviate the endogeneity concerns by implementing the selection model (Heckman 1979;
Papies, Ebbes, and Van Heerde 2017). In this approach, we first model the choice of channel
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deletion and channel contraction to estimate a correction factor, (i.e., inverse Mills ratio, IMR)
which is then included in the second stage performance model (Papies et al. 2017; Wooldridge
2010). If the coefficient of IMR is significant, it indicates the need to correct for self-selection.
In our study, a firm has three choices: 1) not to conduct channel deletion/contraction (i.e.
no deletion), 2) conduct channel contraction (i.e., partial deletion), and 3) conduct channel
deletion (i.e., full deletion). In this situation, literature suggests the use of either multinomial
logit or ordered probit model18 in the first stage (Tucker 2010). We use a multinomial logit
model for modeling the three choices as it does not need the assumption of ordered choices, and
also channel deletion and channel contraction may not be correlated (Bourguignon et al. 2007;
Dubin and McFadden 1984). Further, the multinomial logit provides a suitable econometric
approach in estimating the probabilities that individual firm have undergone channel deletion or
channel contraction.19
Let D denote the random variable taking on the {1, 2, …, J}, where J is a positive integer
representing the firm’s decision of deletion choice. Z denotes a set of explanatory variables that
have a bearing on the deletion decision of the firm. We are interested in knowing how changes in
Z, impacts the response probabilities P(D=j|Z, j=1, 2, …, J). P(D=1|Z) can be determined if we
know the probabilities for j = 2, …, J as all the probabilities sum to one (Wooldridge 2010). The
response probabilities of multinomial logit model can be written as:
@(A = B|D) =

= ./#
1 + ∑01'( = ./$

,

B = 2,3, … , J

and

18

We estimated selection model using ordered probit also as a robustness check. Ordered probit model details are shown in the
Appendix C. The effects of the main variables were substantively consistent, indicating that our model results are fairly robust to
alternative specification of selection model.

19

Multinomial logit model is considered as more robust and interpretable. In our case (three choices), IIA issue of multinomial
logit may not be very relevant or particularly restrictive. Also, multinomial probit is typically considered as weakly identified.
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@(A = 1|D) =

1
1+

∑01'( = ./$

We use the predicted conditional probability of each choice φi given the conditional
probability of all other choice (1 – φi) to calculate the (individual) IMR for the channel deletion
and channel contraction. Then, we use these IMR terms into the second stage model to get
unbiased parameter estimates (Kai and Prabhala 2007).
We need at least one independent variable in the choice model that does not affect
performance to satisfy the exclusion restrictions and allow identification (Puhani 2000). The
channel deletion and contraction decisions may be a function of the macroeconomic conditions
for the business involved. Firms may involve more in deletion strategies during periods of
economic decline. Hence, to control for the endogeneity of channel deletion and contraction, we
use the U.S. GDP growth rate and junk bond yield as the primary instruments. Tavassoli,
Sorescu, and Chandy (2014) note that GDP growth rate reflects the economic situation, and
negative GDP growth indicates recessionary environment. Similarly, higher junk bond yield
reflects economic decline (Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath 2013). Both GDP growth rate and
junk bond yield may influence firm’s channel deletion or contraction decisions but may not
directly affect an individual firm’s performance, making it a good exclusion variable.
We compute the predicated probability of channel deletion and contraction using the
multinomial logit choice model as follows:
Pr (Channel_Deletion_Contractionit = 1) = β0 + β1GDP_Growthit + β2JunkBond_Yieldit
+ β3Market_Turbulenceit + β4Advertising_Intensityit + β5Market_Sizeit + β6Market_Growthit
+ β7Market_Concentrationit + β8Firm_Sizeit + β9Sales_Growthit + β10ROAit
+ β11Financial_Leverageit + β12Profitabilityit + β13SGA_Ratioit + β14B2Bi + β15Producti
+ β16Industry_Dummies + β17Year_Dummies + hit

Next, we calculate the IMR (Papies et al. 2017; Wooldridge 2010) and finally add the
IMR to the performance model. In other words, we estimate our final models (firm value and
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firm risk) by including the IMR as a regressor to obtain unbiased estimates. Full model including
the IMR variable is presented in the Appendix D.
To determine the causal impact of channel deletion strategies, we need to identify
counterfactuals. In our case, we know the firms that undertake channel deletion strategies and
those who did not. We construct propensity score matched sample of firms in the same industry
that did not involve in channel deletion strategies. Following Boyd, Kannan, and Slotegraaf
(2019), our matching process employed a 1:1 nearest neighbor algorithm within each focal firm’s
industry to find one matched counterpart (Barber and Lyon 1996; Thoemmes and Kim 2011).
We create a difference score for each matched observation and use the difference analysis model
to test our moderating hypotheses. To control for the endogeneity of other independent variables,
following prior research, we lag these independent variables by one time period (Morgan and
Rego 2006). We estimate our performance equations using seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) model to alleviate any concern regarding the correlated error structure of two dependent
variables (i.e., firm value and firm risk).
We also operationalized channel contraction as a continuous variable as the closure of 20
outlets may have a different effect than that of 200 outlets. Accordingly, we develop regression
models for the firm value and firm risk using channel contraction intensity (i.e., percentage of
outlets closed in relation to the total outlets):
Firm_Valueit = a0 + a1Channel_Contractionit + a2Market_Turbulenceit + a3Advertising_Intensityit
+ a4Channel_Contractionit*Market_Turbulenceit + a5Channel_Contractionit*Advertising_Intensityit
+ a6Market_Sizeit + a7Market_Growthit + a8Market_Concentrationit + a9Firm_Sizeit
+ a10Sales_Growthit + a11ROAit + a12Financial_Leverageit + a13Profitabilityit + a14SGA_Ratioit
+ a15B2Bi + a16Producti + ∑+
*'( :* !'";%+)&* + ∑,'( q, <=*), + εit
Firm_Riskit = γ0 + γ1Channel_Contractionit + γ2Market_Turbulenceit + γ3Advertising_Intensityit
+ γ4Channel_Contractionit*Market_Turbulenceit + γ5Channel_Contractionit*Advertising_Intensityit
+ γ6Market_Sizeit + γ7Market_Growthit + γ8Market_Concentrationit + γ9Firm_Sizeit
+ γ10Sales_Growthit + γ11ROAit + γ12Financial_Leverageit + γ13Profitabilityit + γ14SGA_Ratioit
+ γ15B2Bi + γ16Producti + ∑+
*'( >* !'";%+)&* + ∑,'( ?, <=*), + µit
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Model Estimation
The observations in the final data set represent a cross-sectional time-series data. We
need to address several issues while estimating a model from such a data set. Hence, we test the
model regarding, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and omitted variables. First, the White test
as well as Breusch-Pagan test failed to reject the null hypothesis for both dependent variables (p
> .10). This indicates that heteroscedasticity is not a concern in our data set. Second, the variance
inflation factor for the models do not exceed a value of 5, equivalent to a tolerance level of .2
(O’brien 2007), indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. Finally, we perform the Ramsey
regression specification error test (Ramsey 1969) to determine the omitted variable concern. The
test statistic is statistically significant, suggesting problems with omitted variables. We also
perform the Durbin Wu Hausman test to determine the validity of our instrument. The test
statistic was statistically nonsignificant (p > .10), suggesting that the instrument is valid.

Results
Effect of Channel Deletion strategies on Firm Value and Firm Risk
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 6 about here]
Analysis of the daily abnormal returns for 15 days around the event reveals significant
stock market reactions, as depicted in Figure 2. Consistent with previous event studies, we
selected the event window with the most significant t-statistic (Boyd et al. 2010; Swaminathan
and Moorman 2009; Tellis and Johnson 2007). As presented in Table 6, with respect to the most
significant event window [0, 0], the announcement of channel deletion and channel contraction
on average indicates positive abnormal stock returns of .64 (p < .01). While our results show that
the overall effects of channel deletion and contraction on firm value are positive and significant,
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there is substantial variation in market response with around 40% of firm events showing
negative abnormal stock returns.
Although, channel deletion has a positive and significant association with abnormal stock
returns (a = 1.21, p < .01), it also increases idiosyncratic risk (γ = .24, p < .05). On the other
hand, channel contraction increases abnormal stock return (a = .49, p < .01) but not the
idiosyncratic risk (γ = .03, n.s.). Our results lend support to H1a and H1b, i.e., channel deletion is
significantly associated with both firm value and firm risk. We also find support for H2a,
indicating that firm value is associated with channel contraction but to a lower extent than that of
channel deletion. However, we do not find support for H2b, indicating no association of
idiosyncratic risk with channel contraction. This may explain the relatively more rampant
instances of channel contraction. Managers may be concerned about their own employment
prospect in case of increased risk due to channel deletion. These results also indicate that channel
deletion and channel contraction need to be treated differently.

Moderating Effects
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here]
The dependent variable for testing moderating effects is the difference in firm
performance (e.g., firm value) between the focal firm and its matched counterpart. Accordingly,
we estimate the influence of contextual factors, and the results are shown in Table 7 and Table 8.
Concerning market turbulence, we find that the firm value associated with the channel deletion is
less positive when the firm operates in more turbulent market (a = -2.77, p < .05), thereby
supporting H3a. However, we do not find support for H3b, which states that the channel
contraction is less valuable for firms operating in a more turbulent market (a = -.01, n.s.). This
indicates that the channel deletion is less valuable for firms operating in a more turbulent market,
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whereas no such attenuating effect was found for channel contraction. Regarding firm risk, we
find support for H4a, which states that the channel deletion enhances the risk for firms operating
in a more turbulent market (γ = .83, p < .05). We do not find support for H4b, i.e., no moderating
effect of market turbulence on the association of channel contraction with firm risk. Hypothesis
H5 is not supported, i.e., advertising intensity does not moderate the relationship of channel
deletion or contraction with firm value. With regard to the moderating role of advertising
intensity on firm risk, the results lend support to H6a (a = –1.07, p < .01) as well as H6b (γ = –.14,
p < .1). Thus, advertising intensity reduces the risks associated with both channel deletion and
channel contraction. The coefficients of correction terms (IMR) are significant, highlighting the
need to correct for the self-selection. In Table 9, we present the result of the selection model.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Our results suggest that channel contraction significantly enhances abnormal stock return
without any risk. To check the non-riskiness of channel contraction, we used the alternate
operationalization of channel contraction i.e., contraction intensity. Model free evidence suggests
an interesting pattern that for up to 11% of channel contraction intensity, the idiosyncratic risk is
quite low. However, idiosyncratic risk increases once contraction intensity goes beyond 11%
(Figure 3). Subsequently, we segregated our channel contraction sample into two groups, one
with more than 11% and the other with up to a 11% contraction intensity. In this case, we
corrected for endogeneity by including a generalized residual as control function in the
performance model (Papies et al. 2017; Wooldridge 2010). As displayed in Table 10, we find
that the firms with more than a 11% channel contraction intensity exhibit significant association
with the idiosyncratic risk (γ = 1.01, p < .05). Here also, advertising intensity reduces the risk
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significantly (γ = –.39, p < .01). We estimated our model using different contraction intensities
(e.g., 12%, 15%), and found consistent results.
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 10 about here]

Robustness Analyses
We ensured the robustness of our results by performing several additional analyses.
Alternative event windows. To test whether the results are robust across alternative event
windows, we re-estimated the models for another event window that shows significant abnormal
returns to channel deletions and contractions, CAR (–1, 0) = .51 (p < .05) with t-value 2.21. As
shown in the Appendix Table W1, we find that majority of the results are stable in terms of
direction and significance.
Alternative selection model. We estimated our model using ordered probit model in the
first stage. Table W2 in the Appendix shows that the effects of the main variables are
substantively consistent, indicating that our model results are fairly robust to alternative
specification of selection model.
Alternative model to estimate abnormal return. We estimated abnormal returns using the
market model. Our results are robust to this alternative specification as exhibited in the Appendix
Table W3.
Anticipated/ Unanticipated events. We assume that investors do not know as much about
the environment surrounding the firm decision as the decision-maker. As a robustness measure,
we account for the scenarios where investors may have anticipation about some of the deletion
decisions. As suggested in the literature, investors may consider some observable firm
characteristic (e.g., profitability) as a cue for the anticipation (Thompson 1995). Accordingly, we
segregated the events pertaining to the firm having negative profitability. Following Eckbo,
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Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) and Thompson (1995), we revised the abnormal stock return
for events with the possibility of prior anticipation (by investors) as:
ASRrevised = ASR * (1 – P)
where, P is the probability that deletion may occur. Since, in our case, there are three
possibilities (i.e., full deletion, partial deletion, and no deletion), P would be 0.33. We reestimated our model after segregating anticipated and unanticipated events. The effects of the
main variables are substantively consistent as shown in the Appendix Table W4.
Alternative firm risk. To test the robustness of our results, we used total risk in place of
idiosyncratic risk. As presented in Appendix Table W5, the results are almost identical to those
we obtained using idiosyncratic risk. We also considered systematic risk and found nonsignificant association (0.02, n.s.) with channel deletion strategies.
One may also perceive that firms delete channel due to financial distress; hence, we
assess the effect of channel deletion strategies on the default risk. We collected data from the
S&P credit rating database and use the methodology adopted by Anderson and Mansi (2009),
and Rego, Billet, and Morgan (2009). We assign a value of 1 to D-rated bonds and 22 to AAArated bonds (Anderson and Mansi 2009). We find non-significant association (12.8, n.s.)
between channel deletion strategies and default risk. It means that channel deletion strategies are
not limited to only poorly performing firms or firms in the stagnant or decaying industries.
Do channel deletion or contraction have long-term effects? We estimated the long-term
effect of channel deletion and contraction using buy-and-hold abnormal return (Sharma, Saboo,
and Kumar 2018; Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2007).
$
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where Rit is the rate of return of ith firm on day t, and Rmt is the rate of return on a market
index in the same time period. We consider one-year period for our calculation.
We also consider longer time window ranging from -300 days to +300 days to calculate
the idiosyncratic risk (Thomaz and Swaminathan 2015). The results indicate no significant effect
on long-term abnormal returns (-0.071, n.s.) as well as idiosyncratic risk (0.028, n.s.). This may
be due to at least two reasons. First, given that channel deletion or contraction are specific
events, other intervening firm actions can obscure the long-term effect. Second, if the stock
market is efficient, investor expectations are captured in the period surrounding the event.

Discussion
Investors are not only interested in the stock return, but also concerned with the risk. In
our study, we develop a novel conceptual framework to (1) establish the link of the channel
deletion and contraction with firm value and firm risk, (2) highlight investors’ screening cues
that influence the impact of channel deletion or contraction on return and risk, and (3) offer
managerial levers to alleviate the risks associated with the deletion strategies. Our study not only
contributes to the existing channel literature, but also to managerial practices.

Implications for Theory
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. We broaden the theoretical
framework of channel related strategy by conceptualizing the effect of channel deletion and
contraction on firm value and firm risk. Our findings establish first linkage between channel
deletion strategies and market performance metrics. Specifically, our work supports the
argument that channel deletion and contraction may lead to substantial cost savings that may
help in enhancing services through the retained channel entities, thus increasing firm value.
Literature also suggests that investors value marketing efficiency in supply-side over demand-
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side gains (Hsu, Fournier, and Srinivasan 2016; Srinivasan et al. 2009). Another probable reason
for enhanced firm value is the cooperation from retained channel entities, as posited by the social
exchange theory. However, channel deletion or contraction may increase the firm (stock) risk.
Our research highlights a trade-off regarding risk and returns that managers should examine.
We also contribute to the literature through the insights provided by the tests of the
moderating hypotheses. We draw on information economics theory to illustrate the financial
market response to channel deletion and contraction, which is novel to channel management
literature. We show that the investors’ reactions depend to a great extent on contextual factors.
Our study extends marketing theory by offering strategies for firms to address investors’
uncertainty following a major channel strategy. Specifically, we demonstrate that advertising
intensity sends a powerful credibility signal to investors that the firm is competitive and that the
deletion strategy is merely a restructuring activity.
This study can be used to understand the impact of other deletion decisions (e.g.,
dropping a program in the university). In recent years, many universities are grappling with the
question of whether dropping a particular MS program would be beneficial and what could be
the risks associated with such an activity. Our conceptualization may aid in understanding that
advertising intensity helps in lowering the risk associated with such action. Further, the return
garnered through deletion strategy may be lower in a more turbulent market (e.g., when there is
higher uncertainty in the number of applications).

Implications for Practice
Our findings have important implications for managerial practice. The capital market
pays close attention to channel deletion and contraction, and managers need to be cognizant of
the risk and return inherent in such channel strategies. Our study’s results demonstrate that firm
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value and firm risk react differently to the channel deletion and channel contractions. Hence, we
conclude that both researchers and managers must distinguish the channel deletion and channel
contraction and attend to their differing performance implications.
Firm value associated with channel deletion is greater than that of firm value associated
with channel contraction. However, channel deletion is significantly associated with
idiosyncratic risk, (which accounts for 80% of firm total risk), suggesting that channel deletion is
a high-risk, high-return strategy. Hence, managers who are open to taking risks may decide for
the channel deletion strategies. Further, the stock market penalizes the firm for channel deletion
in a market with greater turbulence. Channel contraction is preferable in such a situation.
Managers must be cognizant of such issues while involving in the channel deletion strategies. If
managers are risk averse, they may be better off with channel contraction. Channel contraction
seems a relatively better strategy, but only if channel contraction intensity is within 11%. Finally,
to reduce the risks associated with channel deletion or contraction, managers should focus on
enhancing the advertising intensity.
In the post hoc analysis, we find that B2B firms are associated with higher returns (0.571)
than the B2C firms (0.215) in case of channel deletion. However, B2B firms are also associated
with a higher risk (0.343) than B2C firms (0.226). For channel contraction instances, B2B firms
have both higher return (0.428) and lower risk (0.025) than B2C firms that have the return of
0.209 and risk of 0.033. The effect of channel deletion and channel contraction also varies across
products and services focused firms. We find that in the case of channel deletion, productfocused firms are associated with both positive return (0.011) and risk (0.032), while servicefocused firms are associated with negative return (-0.163) and risk (-0.096). In the case of
channel contraction, both product and service-focused firms are associated with positive return
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and risk; however, product-focused firms have a higher return (0.514) than that of service
focused firm (0.401). Similarly, risks associated with product-focused firms (0.627) are higher
than that of service-focused firms (0.258). Taken together, our results suggest that managers of
the B2B firms, as well as product-focused firms, may anticipate a higher return. However, they
should also be prepared for the higher risk.
In line with the study of Coviello et al. (2002), we discern the effects of deletion
strategies on return and risk across B2B/B2C firms as well as product-focused/service-focused
firms utilizing a 2 X 2 table. In other words, we provide a comparison of risk and return across
business goods, business services, consumer goods, and consumer services firms.
Return

Product-focused

Service-focused

Risk

Product-focused

Service-focused

B2B

0.188

0.077

B2B

0.020

- 0.061

B2C

0.358

-0.254

B2C

0.076

- 0.121

We find that product-focused B2C firms are associated with highest returns (0.358);
however, these firms are also associated with the highest risks. Overall, our result suggests that
services-focused B2B firms are the biggest beneficiary of deletion strategies as they are not only
associated with positive returns (0.077) but also lower risks (- 0.061). It seems that business
customers of service-focused firm do not bother much about shifting to the alternate channel of
the focal firm in case of the deletion or contraction of a channel. One possible reason may be that
the focal firm may be more cautious about its business customers and putting the requisite efforts
to shift them to the alternate channel.
It is also possible that investors' reactions may depend on the type of channel that is being
deleted or contracted. In the post hoc analysis, we find that the deletion of company outlets is
associated with an increased return (0.277) and risk (0.239). However, deletion of retailers is
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associated with the negative return (-0.488) and risk (-0.235). In the case of contraction of
company outlets, both return (0.347) and risk (0.155) increases. However, for retailers,
contraction leads to a negative return (-0.064) but a positive risk (0.054). Overall, it seems that
investors better perceive deletion or contraction of company outlets.
We also carried post hoc analysis to calculate return and risk associated with channel
deletion strategies across industries. In Figure 4 and Figure 5, we present a few representative
industries based on the return-risk associated with channel deletion and channel contraction,
respectively. In general, Automotive Dealer and Service Station, as well as Electronic and
Electric Equipment firms, benefitted most from channel deletion, whereas firms in the industry
of Food Stores, as well as Furniture and Home Furnishing, suffered due to channel deletion. In
the case of Miscellaneous Retail (e.g., Dick’s Sporting Goods), in addition to firm value, firm
risk also enhances. Similarly, for Paper and Allied products, both firm risk and firm value
decreases. In case of channel contraction, Automotive Dealer and Service Station, and General
Merchandise Stores (e.g., Target) have a positive return and negative risk, while Leather
Products, and Furniture and Home Furnishing have negative returns and positive risks. In
general, the return-risk associated with channel deletion strategies differs across industries, and
managers should take cognizance of such issues. Overall, our study provides executives
important insights in terms of risks and returns associated with channel deletion and contraction,
thus making a more informed decision about these issues.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]

Limitations and Future Research
This study and the interpretation of the results may be considered in light of various
general and specific limitations, some of which suggest possible avenues for further research.
First, we use abnormal stock returns to capture firm value. Although the abnormal stock return is
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a generally accepted performance measure, further research may employ other outcome metrics
such as Tobin’s Q or Jensen alpha. Second, our research design resulted in examining firms that
were traded on U.S. based stock exchanges (i.e., publicly traded companies in the United States).
Our findings are not necessarily generalizable to privately held firms; however, they may be
generalizable across industries. Future research may consider an appropriate measure to study
the deletion strategies for privately owned firms. Third, it would be useful to conduct in-depth
field studies to gain richer insights into the link between channel deletion strategies and riskreturn performance. Fourth, it is also worthwhile to study the conditions under which the stock
market reacts negatively or positively to the announcement of channel deletion or contraction,
i.e., why some firms show positive returns while others show negative returns. Future studies
may survey managers to get data on some additional control variables such as extent of
coordination, channel intensity, channel power, and channel conflict. Fifth, we consider different
types of channels based on the channel format. Future studies may consider channels from a
technology perspective (e.g., self-service kiosk, vending machine, ATM, etc.) or from an
ownership perspective (e.g., Walmart, Target, Gas stations, etc.). Other study may also
investigate the impact of channel deletion strategies on the competitors of the focal firm.
In our study, we faced the modeling challenge in controlling for the unobserved firm
heterogeneity because most of the firms were involved in the deletion of only one channel. In
future studies, firm heterogeneity may be taken care of in the case of multiple instances of
channel deletion by the focal firm. Our research focuses on the announcement of channel
deletion strategies. It is possible that a firm may announce channel deletion but later on retract or
undertake channel contraction, or even the focal firm may start using its sales channel as the
service channel. For example, Tesla announced the deletion of its store but later continued using
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some of its stores for service purposes (i.e., another channel function). Due to the event study
nature in our research, investors’ reaction gets captured surrounding the announcement of the
event. Hence, future studies may benefit by gathering actual instances of deletion or contraction.
With such data, studies can link channel deletion strategies with firm outcomes such as revenue
and/or operating income.
Studies may also be conducted considering channel addition and channel deletion
together and then ascertain conditions under which either channel addition or deletion is suitable
based on the different market responses. By doing so, there would be a unified framework of
channel addition and deletion that helps in understanding the qualitative difference between
reward and punishment by the stock market. Future studies may also consider different countries
in their data frame to see whether results are generalizable across countries. In a similar
direction, future research may also examine the multinational firms that might have used channel
contraction strategy in one country but channel deletion in another country. In conclusion, we
hope that our work will spark scholarly interest for future research in this important area of
channel strategy.
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Table 1. Examples of Channel deletion and Channel contraction
Firm

Type

Bebe

Channel
Deletion

Sony

Hamilton
Beach

e.l.f.
Beauty
Guess

Tailored
Brands

Macy’s

Description

In the midst of trying to reorganize itself, Bebe announced
today that it will shutter all of its brick-and-mortar locations
by the end of next month. The company statement said that it
would transition to an online-only model.
Channel
Sony announced plans to close its online store. The company
Deletion
statement said that the Sony Store online will stop taking
orders from August 28, 2015. Customers were redirected to
purchase from Sony’s authorized retailers.
Channel
“We have evaluated strategic alternatives to maximize the
Deletion
value of the Kitchen Collection format and reached the
difficult but necessary decision that it is in the best interests
of the company and all of its stakeholders to wind down this
format by the end of 2019,” said Gregory Trepp, president
and CEO of Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company.
Channel
e.l.f. Beauty said that it would close all its company outlets as
Deletion
it looks to focus on expanding its brand in national retailer
and digital channels.
Channel
With 60 stores on the chopping block this year, Guess
Contraction expects store closures to boost its operating income by $16
million annually. CEO Victor Herraro stated that closure
would improve profitability.
Channel
“While we’re striving for improved performance in 2017,
Contraction given the ongoing choppiness and overall declines we’re
seeing in the business, we believe it is appropriate to plan for
trimming the stores to continue.” — Douglas Ewert, chief
executive officer (on the closure of 11 outlets)
Channel
“We looked at every pyramid of the company. We looked at
Contraction benchmarking. We have been planning this very carefully.
This is not something we did quickly.” — Jeff Gennette,
Macy’s president and incoming chief executive officer (on
the closure of 68 outlets)
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Announced
April 21,
2017
August 3,
2015
October 15,
2019

February 28,
2019
March 15,
2017
March 8,
2017

January 4,
2017

Table 2. Distribution of firms across Industries
Industry
Apparel and other textile products
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
Leather and leather products
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Building materials & garden supplies
General merchandise stores
Food stores
Automotive dealers & service stations
Apparel and accessory stores
Furniture and home furnishings stores
Eating and drinking places
Miscellaneous retail
Depository institutions
Personal services

%
5.1
2.3
3.9
1.8
1.4
3.3
9.6
4.3
3.1
19.2
5.7
2.4
11.3
15.1
2.1

Table 3. Measurement Details
Variable
Channel
deletion
Channel
contraction
Firm value
(abnormal
stock return)
Idiosyncratic
risk
Market
turbulence
Advertising
intensity
Market size
Market growth

Market
concentration

Operationalization

Data Source

Activity involving the decision to
discontinue a channel from the firm’s
channel mix
Activity involving the decision to
decrease the number of channel entities
within an existing channel
Cumulative abnormal return over an
event window

LexisNexis, Factiva,
PR Newswires,
BusinessWire
LexisNexis, Factiva,
PR Newswires,
BusinessWire
CRSP

Difference between Standard deviation
of residuals of the Carhart four-factor
model after and before the event
The standard deviation of sales growth
within the industry (four-digit SIC
code) over three years divided by the
mean value of total revenue
Ratio of the firm’s reported advertising
expenditures to sales

CRSP

Thomaz and
Swaminathan (2015)

COMPUSTAT

Homburg et al. (2014)

COMPUSTAT

Gruca and Rego
(2005); Malshe and
Agarwal (2015)
Homburg et al. (2014)

Total sales volume within the SIC code
(four digits)
Annual percentage growth in the
industry sales revenue (using four-digit
SIC codes)
The Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI)
in each (four-digit SIC code) industry
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COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT

COMPUSTAT

Prior Literature
No Prior Research
No prior Research
Boyd et al. (2019);
Homburg et al. (2014)

Dotzel and Shankar
(2019); Panagopoulos
et al. (2018)
Frennea et al. (2019)

Firm size

Log of sales revenue

COMPUSTAT

Sales growth

COMPUSTAT

Event year

Annual percentage growth in sales
revenue
Earnings before extraordinary items in
relation to total assets
Firm’s ratio of total liabilities to total
assets
Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization to sales
Ratio of firm’s sellling general
administrative expenses to sales
A dummy variable that classifies
industries as B2B (1) versus B2C (0)
A dummy variable that classifies
industries as products (1) versus
services (0)
A dummy variable for 2015–2019

Industry
dummies
GDP Growth

A dummy variable according to the
four-digit SIC code
U.S. GDP growth rate

Junk Bond
Yield

Yield on Junk Bonds

ROA
Financial
leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B versus
B2C
Products versus
services

COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT

Dotzel and Shankar
(2019)
Homburg et al. (2014)
Rego, Billet, and
Morgan (2009)
Panagopoulos et al.
(2018)
Frennea et al. (2019)
Bhattacharya et al.
(2019)
Groening et al. (2016);
Frennea et al. (2019)
Groening et al. (2016);
Frennea et al. (2019)

LexisNexis, Factiva,
Newswires

Homburg et al. (2014)

COMPUSTAT

Homburg et al. (2014)

Trading Economics

Tavassoli et al. (2014)

Federal Reserve
Economic Data

Acharya et al. (2013)

Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable
Abnormal Stock Return
Idiosyncratic Risk
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity (%)

Mean
0.64
0.11
6.19
2.83

SD
4.18
1.46
6.07
1.84

Min
-14.38
-9.31
0.29
0.04

Max
20.04
8.26
38.00
9.89

Market Size (ln)

11.55

1.97

8.12

14.47

Market Growth

0.01

0.10

-0.67

0.27

Market Concentration (in
thousands)
Firm Size (ln)

3.08

2.36

0.12

10.00

8.57

1.81

2.98

13.15

Sales Growth
ROA

0.03
0.02

0.12
0.11

-0.35
-0.52

0.83
0.37

Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
GDP Growth (%)

0.72
0.19
0.32
4.43

0.31
0.17
0.11
0.93

0.18
-0.10
0.06
2.69

2.92
0.58
0.61
5.44

Junk Bond Yield (%)

6.27

0.54

5.62

9.05
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix for the Model Variables
Variables
1. Abnormal Stock Return
2. Idiosyncratic Risk
3. Advertising Intensity
4. Market Turbulence
5. Market Size
6. Market Growth
7. Market Concentration
8. Firm Size
9. Sales Growth
10. ROA
11. Financial Leverage
12. Profitability
13. SGA Ratio

1
1.00
-0.12
0.01
-0.05
-0.03
0.12**
0.08
-0.02
0.04
-0.02
-0.07
-0.09
0.01

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.00
-0.17**
-0.08
0.04
0.03
0.01
-0.08
-0.10
-0.08
-0.02
-0.05
0.01

1.00
0.01
-0.32**
-0.15**
0.27**
-0.29**
-0.17**
-0.05
-0.11
-0.27**
0.22**

1.00
0.18**
0.05
-0.16**
0.06
0.03
0.04
-0.01
0.18**
0.05

1.00
0.28**
-0.30**
0.32**
0.30**
0.02
0.25**
0.32**
0.03

1.00
-0.03
-0.02
0.21**
-0.01
-0.12**
0.21**
0.14**

1.00
-0.07
-0.23**
-0.06
-0.22**
-0.23**
-0.09

1.00
0.09
0.18**
0.16**
0.08
-0.25**

1.00
0.23**
0.05
0.29**
0.00

1.00
-0.04
0.21**
-0.27**

1.00
0.31**
-0.06

1.00
0.21**

1.00

Note: ** (p< 0.05)

Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns across various Event Window
Event Window

Mean
(All Data)

t-Value

Mean
(Channel
Deletion)

t-Value

Mean
(Channel
Contraction)

t-Value

-7 to -1 days
Event day [0, 0]
+1 to +7 days
-3 to +3 days
-1 to +1 days
-1 to 0 days
0 to +1 days

0.18
0.64***
0.57*
0.49
0.52**
0.51**
0.53*

0.58
2.72
1.76
1.43
2.02
2.21
1.74

0.36
1.21***
0.95
0.54
0.63**
0.76**
0.59

.67
2.64
1.27
1.02
2.07
2.29
1.53

0.17
0.49***
0.48*
0.33
0.50*
0.48**
0.37*

0.35
2.83
1.81
1.56
1.87
1.99
1.78

Note: *** (p< 0.01), ** (p< 0.05), * (p< 0.10)
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Table 7. Moderating Effects on the impact of Channel Deletion on Firm Value
and Firm Risk
Independent Variables
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity
Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth
ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR

Abnormal Stock Return
Coefficient
SE
**
-2.77
1.34
0.26
1.74
-31.21
22.25
***
201.18
65.27
***
-30.07
9.91
**
8.39
3.85
**
78.47
32.27
-43.41
38.43
10.60
9.03
**
-245.71
107.50
-43.37
46.09
-28.82
34.99
-20.93
18.39
**
-12.49
6.17

Idiosyncratic Risk
Coefficient
SE
**
0.83
0.35
***
-1.07
0.23
***
8.33
2.92
***
-28.26
8.57
0.92
1.30
**
-1.25
0.51
***
-11.17
4.24
13.21
5.04
0.33
1.19
18.83
14.11
***
26.35
6.05
***
14.78
4.59
***
7.07
2.41
**
1.52
0.76

Note: *** (p< 0.01), ** (p< 0.05), * (p< 0.10)

Table 8. Moderating Effect on the impact of Channel Contraction on Firm Value
and Firm Risk
Independent Variables
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity
Market Size

Abnormal Stock Return
Coefficient
SE
-0.01
0.03
-0.15
0.37
*
-13.29
7.54

Idiosyncratic Risk
Coefficient
SE
0.00
0.01
*
-0.14
0.07
*
2.61
1.42

Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth

13.96**
3.89**
0.32
0.31

6.29
1.64
0.38
5.12

-0.06
0.11
-0.14*
-1.68**

1.43
0.37
0.09
0.87

ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio

-0.34
-0.99
8.98
13.39*

6.25
1.95
11.60
7.21

-1.21
-0.47
0.90
0.43

1.42
0.44
2.64
1.64

B2B
Product
IMR

-33.77*
-23.64*
-0.98**

18.49
11.77
0.47

5.63
3.42
0.00

4.21
2.68
0.17
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Table 9. Estimation Results of Selection Model
Channel Deletion
GDP Growth
Junk Bond Yield
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity
Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth
ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product

Channel Contraction

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

-0.48***
0.64**
0.00
-0.04
-0.31*
-0.18
0.06
0.42***
-1.18
-6.00***
-0.22

0.19
0.31
0.01
0.07
0.16
2.03
0.09
0.14
1.41
2.24
0.66

-0.43***
0.91***
0.00
-0.05
-0.10
-2.25
0.11
0.46***
-2.90***
-6.59***
-0.33

0.14
0.24
0.01
0.05
0.11
1.44
0.07
0.09
1.10
1.87
0.49

-1.64
2.99*
0.65
0.85

2.54
1.71
1.07
0.93

3.68**
3.54**
1.46**
1.63**

1.66
1.51
0.66
0.67

Table 10. Estimation Results of Firm Risk with Channel Contraction Intensity
Independent Variables

Idiosyncratic Risk
Coefficient
SE
**
1.01
0.44
0.01
0.01
-0.09
0.08
0.01
0.01
***
-0.39
0.14
*
2.75
1.59
-0.11
1.40
0.05
0.38
*
-0.11
0.06
-1.31
1.17

Channel Contraction
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity
Channel Contraction* Market Turbulence
Channel Contraction* Advertising Intensity
Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth
ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
Endogeneity Correction

-1.91
-0.45
1.87
0.93
6.05
3.36
-0.01
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1.42
0.44
2.61
1.62
4.14
2.67
0.16

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
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. Product vs Service
. B2B vs. B2C
. Industry dummies
. Year dummies

Figure 2: Abnormal Stock Returns Before and After a Channel Deletion/ Contraction
announcement
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Notes: This figure presents the daily firm abnormal returns before and after the channel deletion /
contraction announcements. Day 0 corresponds to the event day.

Figure 3: Channel Contraction Intensity and Firm Risk
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Figure 4: Channel Deletion associated Return-Risk across industries
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Figure 5: Channel Contraction associated Return-Risk across industries
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Appendices
The Effect of Channel Deletion and Channel Contraction on
Firm Value and Firm Risk
A. Triangulation Approach
Managerial Interactions. We interacted with managers of U.S. firms in the months of
May and June in 2019 from various industries, including automotive, leather products, rubber
and plastic products, general merchandise stores, furniture and home furnishing stores. While we
attempted to reach out to 50 managers, we were able to get responses from 34 managers
(contacts generated through the CMO Roundtable that we organize) in the marketing and sales
department to understand their perspectives on channel deletion and channel contraction. We had
face-to-face interactions with 19 managers and telephonic conversations with 15 managers. Each
interaction took, on the average, about 40 minutes. We encouraged these managers to share their
views on issues they deemed relevant to the strategies of channel deletion and contraction.
Talking to managers, it is clear that firms are involved in the channel deletion strategies for
various reasons, including cost savings, reduced channel cannibalization, and enhanced
cooperation from the retained channel entities. However, when probed further for any negative
consequences, most of the responses were, “Hope Not” as they were not expecting any obvious
risks associated with channel deletion or contraction. However, they raised the issue of how it
may affect the firm’s overall profitability/value given the possibility for loss of sales/customers.

B. Control Variables
In line with the extant literature in the marketing strategy area, we consider market size,
market growth, and market concentration as industry-level control variables. Market size is
considered as a significant determinant of firm value (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Katila and
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Shane 2005). We measure market size as the total sales volume within the firm’s four-digit SIC
code (Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014; Karuna 2007). Market growth is the annual
percentage growth in the industry sales revenue at the four-digit SIC code level (Panagopoulos,
Mullins, and Avramidis 2018). Market growth is considered to be related with the firm value as
well as firm risk (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Gruca and Rego 2005). We measure market
concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), which is the sum of the squared
market shares of the firms in the industry at the four-digit SIC code level (Anderson, Fornell, and
Mazvancheryl 2004; Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff 2004). Greater HHI scores indicate a higher
market concentration. The HHI is the most widely used market structure indicator and has been
found to influence firm performance (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1991; Rao et al. 2004).
For firm-related control variables, we consider several variables as suggested in the
literature. As large firms tend to exhibit greater return stability, we controlled for firm size,
measured as the logarithm of firm’s sales (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Groening, Mittal, and
“Anthea” Zhang 2016; Woodroof et al. 2019). Firm size has been considered to be related to firm
value as well as firm risk (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Ferreira and Laux 2007). We compute the
firm’s sales growth as the annual percentage growth in sales revenue between the year of the
event and the year before the event (Tuli, Bharadwaj, and Kohli 2010). Financial leverage
represents the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Panagopoulos et al. 2018). Financial
leverage can decrease expected cash flow from the next period through interest payment
commitments which may impact future risk (Bhattacharya, Misra, and Sardashti 2019; Groening
et al. 2016). We measure ROA as the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items in relation to its
total assets (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). ROA captures a firm's financial efficiency, and
high ROA implies more growth opportunities and greater returns (Bhattacharya et al. 2019). We
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control for profitability to account for the potential for risk seeking by troubled firms (Bowman
1982). We also control for the SGA ratio (Bhattacharya et al. 2019). These control variables are
traditionally included in models that assess the relationship between a marketing strategy and
firm value.
We propose binary variables, 1 to indicate a firm’s focus on B2B (vs. B2C); and to
indicate whether the firm focuses on products coded as 1 (vs. services) according to the firm’s
four-digit SIC code (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava 2008; Morgan and Rego 2009). We
also control for industry fixed effects (Rumelt 1991) through industry dummies and for temporal
effects through year dummies (Dotzel and Shankar 2019).

C. Addressing Selection Bias with Ordered Probit as the Selection Model
For first stage ordered probit model, we define
Di = j

if cj-1 < !!∗ £ cj

j = 1,…,m

where a0 = -¥ and am = ¥. Then
Pij = Pr[Di = j] = Pr[cj-1 < !!∗ £ cj]
= Pr[cj-1 < βXi + ui £ cj]
= Pr[cj-1 - βXi < ui £ cj - βXi]
= Ф(cj - βXi) – Ф(cj-1 - βXi)
where Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ui. For the
ordered probit model, ui is normally distributed i.e., ui ~ N(0, 1) " i = 1, …,n.
Estimates of the first stage ordered probit model are used to construct the inverse Mills
ratio (IMR) terms associated with each choice.
"1i = σu1 (j[c0 - Xi#$ ] - j[c1 - Xi#$ ])/ (F[c1 - Xi#$ ] - F[c0 - Xi#$ ])
"2i = σu2 (j[c1 - Xi#$ ])/ (1 - F[c1 - Xi#$ ])
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where % and & indicate the probability density function and cumulative distribution functions
respectively.

D. Full Model with IMR variable
Firm_Valueit = a0 + a1Market_Turbulenceit + a2Advertising_Intensityit + a3Market_Sizeit
+ a4Market_Growthit + a5Market_Concentrationit + a6Firm_Sizeit + a7Sales_Growthit
+ a8ROAit + a9Financial_Leverageit + a10Profitabilityit + a11SGA_Ratioit + a12B2Bi
&
+ a13Producti + a14IMRit + ∑"
!#$ "! #$%&'()*! + ∑%#$ q% +,-)% + εit
Firm_Riskit = γ0 + γ1Market_Turbulenceit + γ2Advertising_Intensityit + γ3Market_Sizeit
+ γ4Market_Growthit + γ5Market_Concentrationit + γ6Firm_Sizeit + γ7Sales_Growthit
+ γ8ROAit + γ9Financial_Leverageit + γ10Profitabilityit + γ11SGA_Ratioit + γ12B2Bi
&
+ γ13Producti + γ14IMRit + ∑"
!#$ /! #$%&'()*! + ∑%#$ 0% +,-)% + µit

Table W1. Calculations of Abnormal Stock Returns – Alternative Event Window (-1, 0)
Channel Deletion

Channel Contraction

Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity

Coefficient
-3.60**
0.20

SE
1.69
1.64

Coefficient
0.01
-0.05

SE
0.03
0.42

Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth

-23.89
156.17**
-31.28***
5.89*
67.56**

20.98
61.54
9.34
3.63
30.43

-6.92
16.07**
3.57*
0.31
7.98

8.61
7.18
1.87
0.44
5.85

ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR

-37.65
7.23
-198.66**
-34.86
-21.72
-11.47
-10.53*

36.23
8.52
101.36
43.46
32.99
17.34
6.19

0.64
-0.57
5.39*
9.48
-25.89
-18.72
-0.53

7.13
2.22
13.25
5.23
21.11
13.45
0.83
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Table W2. Estimation Results using Ordered Probit Selection Model in First Stage
GDP Growth
Junk Bond Yield
Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity
Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth
ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product

Coefficient
-0.19***
0.33***
0.00
-0.02
-0.08
-0.23
0.03
0.15***
-0.73*
-2.09***
-0.04
0.38
1.44**
0.55**
0.65**

Channel Deletion

SE
0.06
0.11
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.64
0.03
0.04
0.38
0.69
0.22
0.76
0.67
0.33
0.31

Channel Contraction

Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity

Abnormal
Stock Return
-1.51*
-1.53

Idiosyncratic
Risk
-0.20
-0.97***

Abnormal Stock
Return
-0.00
-0.13

Idiosyncratic
Risk
0.00
-0.14*

Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth

-29.53
133.74***
-15.22
8.53*
12.58

9.69***
-13.14**
2.16
0.60
-11.40***

-13.83*
15.97***
-4.29***
0.33
1.08

2.62*
-0.03
0.10
-0.16*
-1.61*

ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability

-71.29
6.21
-42.50

-6.67
0.07
-1.16

-0.59
-0.60
5.84

-1.09
-0.48
0.93

SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR

19.32
9.60
18.98
40.27*

23.24***
24.79***
9.85***
7.36**

13.06*
-37.14**
-27.02**
-3.68

0.30
5.57*
3.35
0.13
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Table W3. Alternative Calculations of Abnormal Stock Returns using Market Model
Channel Deletion

Channel Contraction

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity

-0.95*
3.04***

0.49
0.59

-0.01
0.07

0.02
0.36

Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth

-4.75
112.06***
-8.63**
3.30**
-18.28*

7.53
22.10
3.36
1.31
10.93

-10.34*
4.99
4.78***
0.10
3.81

6.18
6.07
1.59
0.37
4.95

ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR

-76.52***
-12.29***
-53.76
-83.18***
25.32**
16.68***
-4.84**

13.01
3.06
36.40
15.61
11.85
6.23
2.22

-0.38
1.00
-1.68
5.99
-26.59**
-21.48**
-0.87*

6.03
1.88
11.20
6.96
14.86
11.37
0.50

Table W4. Calculations of Abnormal Stock Returns – Anticipated/Unanticipated Events
Channel Deletion

Channel Contraction

Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity

Coefficient
-1.32*
1.96

SE
0.70
1.45

Coefficient
-0.00
-0.84

SE
0.04
0.53

Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration

-28.63*
126.65**
-17.90**

16.53
54.37
8.25

-5.96
19.13**
3.93*

10.85
9.04
2.36

2.82
24.61

3.21
26.88

0.48
9.82*

0.55
5.36

-21.80
-2.17
-128.22*
-50.95
-6.42
11.85
-5.17*

32.01
7.52
69.54
38.39
29.14
15.32
2.87

-0.13
-3.44
12.99
2.16
-25.37
-17.52
-0.56

8.98
2.80
16.68
10.37
26.59
16.93
1.04

Firm Size
Sales Growth
ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR
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Table W5. Alternative Calculations of Firm Risks through Total Risk
Channel Deletion

Channel Contraction

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

Market Turbulence
Advertising Intensity

0.92**
-1.10***

0.37
0.25

0.00
-0.16*

0.01
0.09

Market Size
Market Growth
Market Concentration
Firm Size
Sales Growth

4.89
-27.22***
0.94
-1.47***
-9.94**

3.14
9.22
1.40
0.54
4.56

3.15*
0.41
0.01
-0.12
-2.17*

1.73
1.45
0.38
0.09
1.18

ROA
Financial Leverage
Profitability
SGA Ratio
B2B
Product
IMR

12.90**
0.10
28.87*
26.01***
11.02**
8.36***
2.10**

5.43
1.28
15.18
6.51
4.94
2.60
0.93

-1.09
-0.60
1.00
0.67
6.90*
3.57
-0.01

1.44
0.45
2.67
1.66
4.15
2.71
0.17
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Firms are increasingly involved in channel deletion and channel contraction; however,
there are very few insights on the effect of these strategies on firm performance, and importantly,
why firms are involved in the channel deletion. Essay 1 of my dissertation seeks to investigate
the channel deletion phenomenon by developing a conceptual framework that delineates the
antecedents and consequences of channel deletion. Our study provides novel insights into the
main drivers underpinning the firm’s decision to delete a channel. Based on the knowledge
gained from the extant literature, I also present factors moderating the link between channel
deletion and its antecedents. As we detailed in the Essay 1, channel deletion is expected to have a
significant positive impact on firm performance. We discussed various aspects associated with
channel deletion and in the process, we bring attention of this phenomenon to marketing scholars
and managers.
In this study, we abstain from the debate of whether the firm should employ a single
channel or multiple channels, as various studies have advocated for the use of multiple channels
(Gulati and Garino 2000; Homburg et al. 2014; Kumar and Venkatesan 2005; Kushwaha and
Shankar 2013). We are fundamentally arguing that keeping an array of channels may not always
be the best decision. Our study provides insights about whether channel deletion is bane or boon.
Regarding the most logical candidate for channel deletion, one consideration may be that the
channel which contributes least to the economic value of the firm is suitable for elimination.
Another consideration may be channel share, i.e., the percentage of sales in each channel. Which
channel or how many channels a firm should delete is guided by institutional knowledge. It is
also noteworthy to consider that the firm needs to keep certain channels irrespective of whether
the concerned channel is profitable or not. For example, an online channel is appealing to
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customers as it offers a high degree of accessibility, convenience, and flexibility (Venkatesan et
al. 2007).
Firms persist in competitive markets only if they act efficiently. Käuferle & Reinartz
(2015) emphasize that firms that do not pursue an efficient distribution strategy will not survive
in competitive markets. Hence, depending on context, channel deletion may not be a bane rather
boon, and should be considered as a critical strategic decision for the firm (Chu et al. 2007).
In Essay 2, I hypothesize and empirically test the consequences (in terms of firm value
and firm risk) of channel deletion strategies. In this study, we find a significant positive effect of
channel deletion and channel contraction on firm value. However, there is substantial risk
associated with the deletion strategies. We also highlight investors’ screening cues (e.g., market
turbulence) and firm’s signaling (e.g., advertising intensity) that influence the impact of channel
deletion and contraction on return and risk. In my dissertation study, I do not argue that a firm
should undertake channel deletion strategies as a means to enhance firm value. Instead, I contend
that if a channel does not fit in the big picture of firm strategy, the focal firm may undertake
deletion or contraction. Although channel deletion is often a complex and difficult decision and
associated with risk, it appears that firms are restructuring as they seek to prioritize their
channels.
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